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THE WAGES OF RISK: THE RETURNS OF
CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE
Herbert M. Kritzer*
INTRODUCTION
The contingency fee is one of the defining characteristics of civil
litigation in the United States.' The folklore regarding contingency
fees produces sharply contrasting images. On the one hand, contin-
gency fees represent the average person's "key to the courthouse."'2
Individuals who would otherwise be left with no recourse can pursue
* Professor and Chair of Political Science and Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin-
Madison; B.A., 1969, Haverford College; Ph.D., 1974, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. An earlier version of this Article was presented at the Third Annual Clifford Seminar on
Tort Law and Social Policy, addressing Contingency Fee Financing of Litigation in America,
Chicago, Illinois, April 4-5, 1997 and at the 55"' Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, April 10-12, 1997. The research reported in
this Article was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundations Law and Social
Science Program (Grant No. SBR-9510976). Research assistance was provided by J. Mitchell
Pickerill and Jayanth Krishnan.
1. While a number of countries have some form of contingency fee, the American contingency
fee is relatively unique, both in its form and its dominance as a means of funding litigation.
What sets the American contingency fee apart from contingency arrangements in most other
countries is that it is based on a percentage of recovery. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RHETORIC
AND REALITY . .. USES AND ABUSES . .. CONTINGENCIES AND CERTAINTIES: THE AMERICAN
CONTINGENT FEE IN OPERATION 4-7 (University of Wis. Inst. for Legal Studies Disputes
Processing Research Program Working Paper No. 12-2, 1996) [hereinafter KRITZER, RHETORIC
AND REALITY] (on file with the DePaul Law Review). That is, the American contingency fee is
in reality a percentage or commission fee, and the contingency element arises from the simple
mathematics that a percentage of zero is zero (regardless of the percentage). See John F. Grady,
Some Ethical Questions About Percentage Fees, LITIG., Summer 1976, at 20 (discussing the fair-
ness of percentage fees as plaintiffs' awards escalate while attorneys' work remains constant).
The American contingency fee is most closely associated with personal injury cases, where re-
search shows that virtually all plaintiffs pay their lawyers on a contingency basis. Less well
known is the fact that such arrangements are generally very common whenever the plaintiff is an
individual, the central issue is monetary, and that such arrangements are not forbidden by law.
The Civil Litigation Research Project data showed that 62% of individual plaintiffs in contract
cases had paid their lawyers on a contingency basis, either a pure contingency or a flat fee plus
percentage. HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGA-
TION 59 (1990) [hereinafter KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER]. In social security disability ap-
peals, contingency fee arrangements are the dominant mode of payment of lawyers. See M.
Wade Baughmon, Reasonable Attorney's Fees Under the Social Security Act: The Case for Con-
tingency Agreements, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 253.
2. Philip H. Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual's Key to the Courthouse Door, LITIG.,
Summer 1976, at 27, 28.
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the compensation to which they are entitled.3 At the other extreme,
contingency fees are the source of all evil in the civil justice system:
chasing ambulances for clients, creating expectations that every little
injury deserves large payments in compensation, and filing inflated
and fraudulent claims.4 As is true of most popular images, there is at
least some truth in both extremes. There is no doubt that the contin-
gency fee is extremely important for insuring access to the civil justice
system. 5 The recent adoption of a kind of contingency fee system in
England, I ng pointed to as a system without such an arrangement,
clearly reflects the importance of a workable funding system.6 How-
ever, it is also true that the system creates incentives for lawyers to
seek out potential clients aggressively, and to find ways of pursuing
what sometimes appear to be very dubious claims.7 The fact that the
lawyers who stand at the top of the financial success ladder are mostly
ones who have made large profits from contingency fee work 8 (and
that some of these lawyers make no secret of their financial success)
inevitably raises questions about profiting from others' misfortunes.
One of the problems for understanding the realities of contingency
fees is that most available sources of information provide distorted
images. Cases reported in the popular press represent events that are
news, not ordinary day-to-day events.9 Jury verdicts reported in the
3. Id.
4. See Contingency Fee Abuses: Hearing on Examining Certain Contingency Fee Abuses and
Their Effect on the Tort System Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1997)
(statement of Lester Brickman, Professor Cardozo School of Law). Brickman is one of the lead-
ing proponents of the position that contingency fees have led to major problems and abuses. See
also LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES 20-23 (1994) [hereinafter
BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES] (suggesting that many contingency fee ar-
rangements are unethical); Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet
Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 30 (1989) [hereinafter Brickman, Contin-
gent Fees Without Contingencies] ("[F]or a contingent fee to be valid, there must be an actual
controversy, which means a realistic risk of nonrecovery."); Lester Brickman, On the Relevance
of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort System Outcomes Are Principally Determined by
Lawyers' Rates of Return, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755, 1757-62 (1994) (proposing that growth in
tort liability has been caused, in large part, by plaintiffs' lawyers' desires for even higher rates of
return).
5. Corboy, supra note 2, at 27 (providing examples of how the contingency fee ensures access
to the civil justice system).
6. See KRITZER, RHETORIC AND REALITY, supra note 1, at 6 (outlining England's develop-
ment of conditional fees in 1995).
7. See BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES, supra note 4, at 13 (contending
that plaintiffs' lawyers overly favorable fees are attracting many more attorneys to the field).
8. See Brigid McMenamin, The Best-Paid Lawyers, FORBES, Nov. 6, 1995, at 145 (reviewing
the 25 top paid corporate and trial lawyers).
9. See Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as
Your Guide, 80 JUDICATURE 64, 65 (1996) (examining the media's interest in focusing their re-
porting on sensational tort litigation).
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popular press tend to represent extreme outliers, with the average
award of the reported cases being ten times or more the average
award of all cases.10 Jonathan Harr's recent book, A Civil Action, de-
scribes how a big case can create tremendous incentives but also lead
to disastrous outcomes for the lawyer who gambles and loses.11 To
understand the realities of contingency fee legal practice, one cannot
rely upon anecdotal reports of individual cases or lawyers, or on the
patterns reflected in news reporting. Only carefully designed, system-
atic research can provide an accurate picture of typical contingency
fee practice patterns and the range and variability of those practices.
Drawing upon both extant and new data sources, the analysis that fol-
lows describes the economic returns of contingency fee practice. 12
Part I of the paper deals with some preliminaries and then in-
troduces the notion of "effective hourly rate." In Part II, I briefly
review two extant studies of effective hourly rates before turning to a
variety of sources of information that might provide information on
effective hourly rates:
* Annual income data in economic surveys of lawyers;
* Unpublished annual income and effort data; and
* The Wisconsin Contingency Fee Study.
The latter source provides extensive information on:
" The types of contingency fee arrangements used by Wisconsin
lawyers;
" Effective hourly rates on a case-by-case basis (and how those
rates vary depending on case, lawyer and practice characteristics);
and
* Effective hourly rates based on annual income data.
In Part III, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my
findings for debates over the contingency fee.
10. See id. at 67; Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 772-774 (1995) (comparing personal injury jury verdicts reported in major
newspapers with the averages of all personal injury jury verdicts in the reporting area).
11. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995).
12. This analysis is part of a larger study of contingency fee legal practice I conducted that
examined a range of issues about contingency fees. This is actually the second report of analysis
from the project. The first question examined the screening practices of contingency fee lawyers.
Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the American Civil Justice System,
81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997) (giving a more in depth analysis of screening practices); Herbert M.
Kritzer, Holding Back the Floodtide: The Role of Contingent Fee Lawyers, 70 WIs. LAW., Mar.
1997, at 10 (discussing the analysis of screening practices briefly); Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent
Fee Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement Expectations and Settlement Realities (last modified
Aug. 20, 1997) <http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/-kritzer/settle.htm> [hereinafter Kritzer, Contingent
Fee Lawyers and Their Clients] (discussing contingency fee lawyers' influence over clients in the
settlement process).
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I. UNDERSTANDING CONTINGENCY FEES
A. Some Preliminaries
While the most salient difference between contingency fees and ar-
rangements such as an hourly fee or a flat fee is in how the fee is
calculated, there are other important differences as well. The normal
hourly fee or flat fee simply purchases the services of a lawyer. Under
a contingency fee arrangement, the client also purchases additional
services. The first is financing. Often clients (particularly individuals)
are required to pay for these services up front, before the lawyer per-
forms the services.' 3 Even if that is not the case, lawyers typically bill
their hourly and flat fees, and their expenses, as cases progress, with
the expectation, not always correct, that the clients will promptly pay
the bill. By their nature, contingency fees are not normally collected
until the matter is closed. Very often, lawyers also defer the collection
of expenses until the close of a case. Thus, the contingency fee lawyer
finances the litigation for the client while a case is pending.
The second additional service that the client purchases is a form of
insurance. While in many states clients are liable for expenses regard-
less of the outcome of a case, the reality is that lawyers who pursue a
case unsuccessfully on a contingency basis seldom collect those ex-
penses (or even seek to collect them). Thus, the lawyer effectively
insures the client for the expenses associated with pursuing a claim. In
addition to insuring for the out-of-pocket expenses, the lawyer also
insures the value of his or her time. If the lawyer obtains no recovery
for the client, the lawyer absorbs the entire opportunity cost of the
time expended on the case. 14 In a significant fraction of cases, the
lawyer may obtain some fee, but that fee still does not cover the op-
portunity cost of the lawyer's time. In either of these situations, the
lawyer effectively insures the client for the value of the lawyer's time.
The popular image of the contingencies involved in the contingency
fee does not fully represent the way the fee works. The obvious con-
tingency is that the lawyer risks receiving nothing if he or she fails to
recover for the client. For most contingency fee lawyers this is proba-
13. Lawyers typically insist on prepayment where possible because they are well-aware of the
problems of collecting a fee after a matter is closed, particularly if the outcome is not good from
the client's perspective. See Abraham Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game:
Organizational Cooptation of the Profession, L. & Soc'y REV., June 1967, at 15, 24-28. One
advantage that the contingency fee lawyer has is that the actual collection of the fee is usually
not a problem because the lawyer typically receives the defendant's payment on behalf of the
client, and then deducts fees and expenses before disbursing funds to the client.
14. An opportunity cost analysis presumes that the lawyer can receive compensation for alter-
native uses of his or her time.
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bly the least important contingency. Rational lawyers want to screen
out cases with a low probability of obtaining a recovery. The more
important contingencies facing lawyers are the uncertainties over the
amount of the recovery and amount of investment by the lawyer that
will be necessary to obtain the recovery. At the time a lawyer signs up
a new contingency fee client, the lawyer typically has some idea of the
general size of the case. However, the reality is that the lawyer only
knows that a quadriplegia case is probably worth a lot more than a
routine soft tissue case. Cases can change, either increasing in value if
the lawyer can locate additional insurance coverage or something goes
wrong during the client's treatment, or decreasing in value if the client
enjoys an extremely good recovery. In addition, the uncertainties of
comparative negligence need to be factored in. How such uncertain-
ties might affect the case depends on the stage at which the case is
resolved. 15 Even more problematic for the lawyer is that the opposing
party's decisions regarding how to handle a case largely determine
how much time and effort the case will take. The opposing side might
immediately offer to tender its insurance policy limits or, alternatively,
fight the case up and down the court system.
B. Understanding Outcomes from the Lawyer's Perspective
The focus of the analysis below is on "effective hourly rates"
("EHR"): the fee received by the lawyer divided by the amount of
time the lawyer had to expend to obtain that fee. This measure cap-
tures the various elements of the contingencies facing the lawyer. The
numerator, the fee received, is a function of both the amount of dam-
ages and whether the lawyer obtains any recovery for the client. The
denominator is the amount of time the case actually took.
damages x recovery
EHR =
hours
Across a number of similar cases, the variation in the numerators and
denominators reflect the risks and uncertainties of those cases.
It is useful to focus on this measure because it is precisely what
some critics of contingency fees have attacked, suggesting that lawyers
are frequently able to obtain "effective hourly rates of thousands and
15. For example, a driver of a car stopped at a traffic light might be severely injured by a
drunk driver who loses control of his or her car. During settlement negotiations, the plaintiffs'
lawyer is able to conceal the fact that the driver of the stopped car had also been drinking,
justifying this on the grounds that it was irrelevant to the fact that his client was injured. How-
ever, in a trial situation, this fact would certainly come out in the course of testimony, and the
jury might decide to attribute some responsibility to the injured driver.
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even tens of thousands of dollars. ' 16 While there are some cases that
do earn lawyers fees that translate into rates of $1,000 or more per
hour, we know little about the frequency of such cases, or, more im-
portantly, what the typical effective hourly rates look like. Economists
would argue that the economically rational lawyer would demand to
do better, on average, from contingency fees than from hourly (or
flat) fees because the contingency fee lawyer is providing additional
services to the client which merit compensation. 17 However, this type
of economic rationality presumes an opportunity cost analysis in
which the contingency fee lawyer has alternative uses of his or her
time that will provide a known level of compensation. 18 In situations
where a lawyer has uncommitted time, the lawyer may be willing to
accept cases where the lawyer expects the compensation to be less
than what the lawyer would like to believe is the value of the time
involved. 19
C. Extant Effective Hourly Rate Studies
There is surprisingly little extant research on the kinds of fees and
incomes lawyers earn from contingency fee work. Some of the most
successful practitioners make no effort to hide their financial success,
but these lawyers, persons like Joseph Jamail or John O'Quinn, are
not typical contingency fee practitioners.20 Publications targeted at
the profession often trumpet the names of the members of the profes-
sion with the highest incomes, who are frequently contingency fee
practitioners. 2' I could find only two published studies that provide
systematic information on effective hourly rates earned from contin-
gency fee cases.22
The first study is from the early 1970s and it considered only medi-
cal malpractice cases.2 3 This study, based on a survey of 671 lawyers, 24
16. Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 269 (1996).
17. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 448-49 (2d ed. 1977) (explaining
that contingency fees are normally higher than hourly rates because they compensate the lawyer
for the loan of his services); Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis
of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1153-54 (1970) (dis-
cussing lawyers' actions based on their willingness to take financial risks).
18. See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 17, at 1153 (suggesting that lawyers with spare time or
light caseloads would be willing to accept higher risk contingency arrangements).
19. See JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PRACTITION-
ERS IN CHICAGO 13-17 (1962) (discussing young lawyers' difficulties in getting clients).
20. See McMenamin, supra note 8, at 160 (profiling the top trial lawyers).
21. Id.
22. See infra notes 23, 30 and accompanying text.
23. Stephen Dietz et al., The Medical Malpractice Legal System, in APPENDIX: REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 113-116 (1973).
[Vol. 47:267
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reported mean effective hourly rates for plaintiffs' lawyers somewhere
in the range of $61 to $84.25 This range primarily reflects uncertainty
about and the treatment of co-counsel or referral fees.26 The authors
of the study compared these figures to the mean hourly rate charged
by medical malpractice defense lawyers, $47, and concluded that the
"'effective hourly fee' is not excessively large ... [and that] plaintiff
and defense fees are in the same general ballpark. '27 It is worth not-
ing that the use of mean hourly rates here would have tended to skew
the figures upward.28 More typically, for data such as these, one
would expect median rates to be reported.2 9
The second published study on effective hourly rates is from the
Civil Litigation Research Project ("CLRP"), a large federally financed
study conducted in the early 1980s.30 This study focused on a sample
of federal and state cases selected from courts in five federal judicial
districts around the country: Eastern Pennsylvania (Philadelphia),
Central California (Los Angeles), South Carolina, New Mexico, and
Eastern Wisconsin (Milwaukee). 31 The analysis of effective hourly
rates from this study is reported in the CLRP's Final Report and in
The Justice Broker.32 The overall median effective hourly rate for con-
24. The sample design for this study combined a national mail survey of lawyers selected from
Martindale-Hubbell with a "selective" mail and in-person survey of lawyers known to do medi-
cal malpractice cases. Id. at 89-91. In the original sample, about two-thirds of the targeted re-
spondents were from the national sample, with the remaining from the selective sample, but in
the final sample only 23% were from the selective survey. Id. However, if one eliminates from
the national survey those who had had no contact with medical malpractice cases during the time
frame covered in the questionnaire, 59% were from the selective survey. Most of the respon-
dents, 80-90%, were plaintiffs' lawyers. Id.
25. Id. at 115. The arithmetic mean is the average of a group of figures.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 116.
28. My guess is that Dietz and his colleagues chose to present the mean effective hourly rate
for contingency fee lawyers because that figure was substantially higher than the median. Thus,
using the higher figure would undercut criticisms that their figures seemed too low. Stephen
Dietz told me that he could not remember the exact reason they had used the mean rather than
the median. Telephone Interview with Stephen Dietz, Senior Vice President, Westat (Sept. 22,
1994). He did say, however, that he recalled that even using the mean, the effective hourly rate
of contingency fee lawyers was only about 20% above what the typical hourly fee defense lawyer
charged. Id. This is correct if one uses the lowest of the various figures after adjusting for co-
counsel and referral fees. Dietz also informed me that the data from the 1973 study is no longer
available. Id. Consequently, it is not possible to reanalyze that data to obtain the median figure.
29. The median is the middle number in a set of figures.
30. DAVID M. TRUBEK ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT FINAL REPORT: PART
C (1987) [hereinafter CLRP].
31. Id.
32. See KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER, supra note 1, at 137-46 (providing data on effective
hourly rates); Herbert M. Kritzer et al., Winners and Losers in Litigation: Does Anyone Come
Out Ahead?, in CLRP, supra note 30, at 52-59, 78 [hereinafter Kritzer, Winners and Losers in
Litigation] (providing data on effective hourly rates).
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tingency fee lawyers was $42 (the mean was $89).33 In the lowest
twenty-five percent of the cases, contingency fee lawyers earned $7
per hour or less.34 In the top twenty-five percent of the cases, contin-
gency fee lawyers earned $94 or more. 35 The top ten percent of law-
yers in the study earned fees of $198 per hour or more.36 These
figures show that very large effective hourly rates are possible, but
typical effective hourly rates are not extreme. 37 For comparison, the
median hourly rate reported by hourly fee lawyers in the same study
was $50.38 The information on effective hourly rates from the CLRP
study is quite rich. Table 1 shows the information broken down in a
variety of ways.39 Two items are particularly interesting. Effective
hourly rates tend to go down for small cases (those with awards under
$10,000) with a median of $36, and only reach a median range of $57-
$58 for the common range of cases yielding awards above $10,000.
Also, it appears that contingency fees in cases other than contracts
and torts are very risky. For example, in non-contract, non-tort cases,
the median is only $6. In fact, thirty-eight percent of these cases yield
no fee at all.
There is another way to look at the data in Table 1. This is impor-
tant because one might be tempted to look at the mean effective
hourly rates and conclude that they suggest a problem because of the
big gaps between the mean and the median figures. However, this
comparison does not give an accurate picture of reality because the
variations in the individual case figures depend on both the numerator
and denominator of the effective hourly rate equation, and the ob-
served skew might result from one or both of these elements. Because
of this, if the interest is in the average fee earned per hour by contin-
gency fee lawyers, we cannot simply average the effective hourly rates.
A better procedure is to sum all of the fees earned by contingency fee
lawyers and to sum all of the hours worked on those cases by them,
33. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER, supra note 1, at 138-39; Kritzer et al., Winners and Losers
in Litigation, supra note 32, at 78.
34. See supra note 33.
35. See supra note 33.
36. See supra note 33. The mean is not reported. I have computed that from the original data.
37. It would be nice to be able to compare these figures to those from Dietz. See supra note
28 and accompanying text. However, data from only six contingency fee lawyers handling medi-
cal malpractice cases were available. Interestingly, the mean was $52. For three cases, the effec-
tive hourly rate was $0, and the other three were $47, $77, and $267 respectively. My data shows
that Dietz's use of means most likely overstated the difference between hourly and contingency
fee lawyers. There is a significant possibility that the median hourly rate in the earlier study was
actually less than the median hourly rate charged by defense lawyers.
38. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER, supra note 1, at 138.
39. Most of these figures are from Table 9-2. Id. at 139. I have added to the information in
the book means and maximums.
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and then divide the two. This produces the mean fee earned per hour
worked, which is a different figure than the mean effective hourly rate.
Doing this yields a mean hourly return of $47 for all contingency fee
cases in the sample versus an EHR of $89. Taking only cases under
$10,000, which constitute almost half of the sample,40 the mean return
per hour is only $25. This is well below the comparable mean of $62.
These two existing studies do not show a large proportion of contin-
gency fee cases yielding extremely high hourly returns for lawyers.
The CLRP data show that occasional high hourly returns do occur.
41
The situation, however, may have changed in the fifteen to twenty-five
years since these studies were completed. It may also be that the fre-
TABLE 1
EFFECTIVE HOURLY RATESa
First Third 90th
Group Mean Median Quartile Quartile Percentile Maximum nc
All Cases $89 $42 $7 $94 $198 $2,500 349
By stakes
<$10,000 $62 $36 $12 $70 $155 $590 129
$10,000-$50,000 $98 $57 $10 $105 $220 $614 120
>$50,000 $203 $58 $19 $160 $270 $2,167 33
By court
Federal $91 $40 $0 $92 $182 $2,167 167
State $88 $43 $16 $95 $200 $2,500 182
By area of law
Torts
All $92 $49 $14 $101 $209 $2,167 232
Federal $113 $56 $0 $104 $250 $2,167 90
State $79 $44 $19 $100 $200 $590 142
Contracts
All $118 $47 $19 $117 $205 $2,500 71
Federal $101 $56 $37 $138 $205 $614 35
State $135 $45 $4 $94 $205 $2,500 36
Neither torts
nor contracts
All $29 $6 $0 $45 $71 $255 50
Federal $28 $5 $0 $41 $75 $255 40
State $30 $25 __b - - $65 10
aSOURCE: HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY
LITIGATION 139 (1990) (with corrections); Civil Litigation Research Project data.
bNumber of cases insufficient for meaningful statistic.
cThe notation "n" represents the number of respondents in each grouping.
40. The only reason these smaller cases do not constitute much more of the sample is because
the study was designed to have equal numbers of state and federal cases. The median case in
state court involved only $4,500 in stakes. See id. at 31.
41. See Kritzer et al., Winners and Losers in Litigation, supra note 32, at 55, 78.
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quent high hourly rates come not in cases that get filed in court (which
is true of all the cases in the CLRP study, and probably most or all of
the cases in the medical malpractice study), but those that are settled
quickly before formal litigation begins. In the balance of this Article,
I turn to more recent data to see what if anything we can say about
typical returns being earned by contingency fee lawyers.
II. ESTIMATING EFFECTIVE HOURLY RATES
Getting reasonable data on the rates charged by lawyers working on
an hourly fee basis is reasonably straightforward, and there are many
published reports that contain information on these rates.42 However,
there is no central registry of cases, settlements, or lawyer effort for
cases handled on a contingency basis. Nor are there any regular
surveys of the returns that lawyers obtain from contingency fee work.
In this Part, I draw upon a variety of sources to get estimates of the
kinds of effective hourly rates that lawyers regularly obtain from con-
tingency fee work. None of the sources alone is ideal, but by looking
at a variety of sources, it is possible to "triangulate" the information to
arrive at reasonable estimates of the rates that lawyers typically ob-
tain. The best information comes from a recent survey that I con-
ducted of contingency fee practitioners in the state of Wisconsin.43
The remainder of this Article devotes substantial attention to report-
ing analyses of those data. The data have the obvious limitation of
reflecting the situation in only a single state, but the patterns are suffi-
ciently similar to what I have obtained from other sources. Therefore,
there is a high probability that the general picture the Wisconsin data
provides is applicable to many, if not most, areas of the country. As I
discuss below, this is borne out by some sketchy results from a 1991
national survey of members at the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America ("ATLA").44
A. Estimating Effective Hourly Rates from Published Data
A number of state bar associations conduct periodic economic
surveys of their memberships (see Appendix 1). Some of the reports
42. See infra Appendix 1.
43. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the basis, scope and
findings of the study).
44. See James H. Stock & David A. Wise, Market Compensation in Class Action Suits: A
Summary of Basic Ideas and Results, 16 CLASS AcroN REP. 584, 585-89 (1993); James H. Stock,
Compensation for Nonpayment Risk in Legal Cases Taken on Contingency: Economic Frame-
work and Empirical Results (final draft June 18, 1992) [hereinafter Stock, Compensation for
Nonpayment Risk] (on file with the DePaul Law Review). This survey obtained responses from
645 lawyers-a response rate of 23.3%-around the country.
[Vol. 47:267
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are sufficiently detailed to permit making estimates of the likely effec-
tive hourly rates that typical personal injury contingency fee lawyers
are able to achieve. This requires three pieces of information: annual
income by specialization after expenses but before taxes, percentage
of gross receipts consumed by overhead, and number of hours de-
voted to remunerative work. Using these data one can estimate a
range in which the typical effective hourly rate is likely to fall. I have
done this by identifying high and low figures for each component (in-
come, overhead, and hours) from the various state reports, and then
using those figures to estimate a likely range. The reports I examined
were from Colorado (1993), Florida (1984), Iowa (1990), Michigan
(1991, 1994), Nebraska (1994), New Hampshire (1990), Ohio (1990,
1994), Texas (1992), and Wisconsin (1986, 1992).45 One problem with
these reports is that there is no common definition of who is a per-
sonal injury specialist. In some states, as low as twenty-five percent of
the practice is devoted to personal injury work, for others it is as high
as eighty percent, and for still others it is simply the area with the
largest proportion of the respondent's practice regardless of
percentage. 46
These reports show median incomes for personal injury plaintiffs'
lawyers ranging from a low of $63,000 in New Hampshire (1990) to a
high of $108,000 in Texas (1992).47 Based on these figures, plus the
others available, my best estimate of the median income of personal
injury attorneys is $70,000 to $80,000. Median figures for overhead as
a percentage of gross receipts ranged from thirty-eight percent in Ne-
braska (1994) to a high of fifty percent in Wisconsin (1992).48 I esti-
mate that the national median is somewhere in the range of forty to
forty-five percent. Most of the surveys reported the number of billa-
ble hours per week, with figures ranging from a low of thirty-two
hours per week in Nebraska (1994)49 to a high of forty hours per week
45. See infra Appendix 1.
46. See infra Appendix 1. Most surveys include a "general practice" option.
47. THE 1990 DESKTOP REFERENCE ON THE ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE IN NEW HAMP-
SHIRE 11 (1990); HOURLY RATE REPORT: 1992 ATTORNEY BILLING AND COMPENSATION SUR-
VEY 12 (1992). The unpublished summary sheet from Colorado showed the mean as $112,700.
48. BECKY WEINER, 1992 ECONOMICS OF PRACTICE SURVEY REPORT 26 (1993); 1994 Mem-
bership Survey Results, NBSA NEWS, June 1994, at 11. These figures are for all private practice
lawyers. Some of the surveys broke down overhead by size of firm, and I have reported above
some of the higher or lower figures. From the distributions, I estimate that this range represents
the overall medians.
49. THE 1991 DESKTOP REFERENCE ON THE ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE IN MICHIGAN
1221 (1991). This figure is my estimate based on information reported. The next lowest was 33
hours per week in Wisconsin in 1992. Three surveys from 1984 or 1985 reported a figure of 30
hours per week. 1994 Membership Survey Results, NBSA NEWS, June 1994, at 7; see infra Ap-
pendix 1.
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TABLE 2
ESTIMATING EFFECTIVE HOURLY RATES
FROM ANNUAL INCOME DATAa
Best
Low Low Best High High
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Annual net income
before taxes $63,000 $70,000 $80,000 $108,000
Overhead as a
percentage of gross 36% 40% 45% 52%
Estimated gross income $98,000 $117,000 $145,000 $225,000
Billable hours worked 1500 1650 1700 2000
Effective Hourly Rate 1 $49 $69 $88 $150
Effective Hourly Rate 2 $65 $71 $85 $112.5
'SOURCE: Estimated from various state bar economic surveys (see supra text accompanying
note 45).
in Michigan (1990).50 If one assumes that lawyers work forty-eight to
fifty weeks a year, this produces a range from 1,536 to 2,000 billable
hours. For my purposes, I will assume a range of 1,500 to 2,000, with a
best estimate figure of 1,650-1,700.51
Table 2 shows the various figures above, and estimates of effective
hourly rates derived from the computational elements (hours worked,
income, and overhead). Appendix 2 details the procedure used to ob-
tain the estimates. There are two different sets of estimates. The first
("Effective Hourly Rate 1") assumes that the lawyers with the lowest
incomes work the most hours and those with the highest incomes
work the fewest. This approach produces the most extreme estimates.
The second ("Effective Hourly Rate 2") assumes that the lawyers with
the lowest incomes worked the fewest hours and the lawyers with the
highest incomes the most hours; this produces estimates in a narrower
range. It is best to think of the results in terms of interval estimates:52
" the 90% interval estimate is $69-$88;
* the 95% interval estimate is $65-$112; and
" the 99% interval estimate is $49-$150.
50. See infra Appendix 1.
51. One national survey of small law firms that I found reported a median figure of 1,637 and
an average figure of 1,685. See ALTMAN & WEIL, INC., THE SMALL LAW FIRM ECONOMIC SUR-
VEY 38 (1988).
52. An interval estimate states a range in which an unknown value has a particular probability
of falling.
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TABLE 3
RECENT FIGURES ON THE MEDIAN ANNUAL INCOMES
AND MEDIAN HOURLY RATES OF LITIGATORS'
Personal Personal
Injury Injury
Plantiffs' Defense General All
State Yearb Lawyers Lawyers Litigators Lawyers
Coloradoc 1993 $112,712 $68,971 $96,737 $72,237
Coloradoc 1989 $59,706 $58,432 $56,350 $43,000
Ohio 1994 $70,000 $68,000 $74,000 $69,750
$100/hr. $87/hr. $132/hr. $110/hr.
Ohio 1990 $80,000 $59,000 $76,500 $60,000
$95/hr. $80/hr. $115/hr
Iowa 1990 $59,500
"personal injury" $69,000 $87,000
"professional malpractice" $68,000 $116,000
"product liability" $46,500 $87,000
other torts $85,000 $70,000
Texas 1992 $108,954 $84,926 $92,758 $84,607
$125/hr. $110/hr. $135/hr.
New Hampshire 1990 $63,000 $50,000 $54,000 $51,000
$100/hr. $95/hr. $125/hr.
Michigan 1994 $74,200 $75,000 $80.000 $68,000
$125/hr. $95/hr. $145/hr. $125/hr.
Michigan 1991 $70,000 $64,000 $65,000 $60,000
$100/hr. $80/hr. $125/hr.
Michigan 1988 $63,000 $52,000 $50,000 $50,000
$100/hr. $75/hr. $100/hr.
Wisconsin 1986 $62,500 $77,273 $42,851
'SOURCE: Various state bar economic surveys (see Appendix 1).
bYear of the survey; normally, the income is for the preceding year.
cThe figures for Colorado are means; for all other states they are medians.
If I had to choose a single point estimate based on this analysis, it
would be an effective hourly rate of $80.
This figure may seem low given the popular image that plaintiffs'
lawyers are doing considerably better these days than are lawyers de-
fending personal injury ("P1") cases and the assumption that hourly
rates for PI defense lawyers are over $100 per hour. However, the
economic surveys suggest a murkier picture.53 Table 3 shows median
incomes and hourly rates reported in a variety of recent economic
surveys. The table includes figures for PI plaintiff, PI defense, general
53. See infra Table 3.
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litigation,54 and all lawyers. The hourly rates shown are those quoted
in the Iowa and Wisconsin surveys.55 There is no appreciable differ-
ence in other surveys (Colorado, Ohio, and Michigan). 56 For those
surveys where figures were available for general litigators, their in-
comes tended to fall between figures reported for PI plaintiff and de-
fense attorneys. Note that my best estimate of the effective hourly
rate for plaintiffs' lawyers is in the same ball park as the hourly rates
quoted by defense lawyers-$75 to $95, except for Texas where the
rate is $110. 57
These data also provide some idea of how the relative incomes of
personal injury contingency fee lawyers have changed over the years
relative to personal injury defense lawyers. This is relevant given the
claim that incomes of plaintiffs' lawyers have been rising dispropor-
tionately to those of defense lawyers.58 I obtained reports from a
number of older economic surveys, five dating from the 1960s (Ore-
gon, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Texas) and one from the
early 1970s (Michigan), that broke median income down by spe-
cialty.59 Table 4 summarizes the results from these older surveys.60
Overall, these figures do not provide a consistent picture of a signifi-
cant shift from a situation of income equality between plaintiffs' and
defense lawyers. They do seem to suggest that typical plaintiffs' law-
yers in large cities have moved from a highly marginalized practice
setting, consistent with Carlin's description of the early 1960s,61 to a
situation that does not differ sharply from that of defense lawyers in
terms of income.
54. The label used for this category varies from survey to survey (e.g., "trial practice," "litiga-
tion," etc.).
55. See infra Appendix 1.
56. See infra Appendix 1.
57. See infra Table 3. Interestingly, if I take the median income of Texas personal injury
("PI") plaintiffs' lawyers ($108,000) and apply my "best case" figures for overhead (42.5%) and
billable hours (1,675), I get an effective hourly rate of $112, which is virtually identical to the
median hourly rate of $110 quoted by PI defense lawyers.
58. See Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies, supra note 4, at 105.
59. I expect that there are other economic surveys. I have listed all of the reports I have
obtained in Appendix 1.
60. Another summary can be found in a publication of the American Bar Association. COM-
MITEE ON ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE, ECONOMIC FACTS ABOUT LAW PRACTICE (1966).
Using data from several, unnamed state surveys, this report shows the income of negligence
defense attorneys as $18,200 compared to $14,900 for negligence plaintiffs' attorneys.
61. CARLIN, supra note 19, at 13 (describing a plaintiffs' lawyer's work as segmented between
personal injury and divorce to wills and probate estate).
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TABLE 4
HISTORIC FIGURES ON THE MEDIAN
ANNUAL INCOMES OF LITIGATORSa
Personal Personal
Injury Injury
Plantiffs' Defense General All
State Yearb Lawyers Lawyers Litigators Lawyers
Illinois 1964
Chicago $12,500 $24,000 $25,000 $18,000
downstate $18,000 $22,000 $17,800 $17,200
Michigan' 1963 $14,894 $19,078 - "about"
$13,000
Michigan 1973 $30,221 $28,999 - $25,324
Oregon 1963 $11,150 $14,000 - $11,500
Pennsylvania 1965 $16,000
Pittsburgh $20,000 $11,500 $16,800 $19,300
Philadelphia $13,000 $14,800 $14,500 $18,000
other (except Erie) $14,600 $17,800 $18,900 -
Texas 1967 $14,000 $18,000 $15,000 $13,500
'SOURCE: Various state bar economic surveys (see Appendix 1).
bYear of the survey; normally, the income is for the preceding year.
T'he figures for Michigan in 1964 are means; for all other surveys they are medians.
B. Unpublished Annual Income and Effort Data
As part of my research, I obtained the raw data from the 1992 Wis-
consin Bar's economic survey.62 This survey included data on primary
billing method, income, 63 overhead as a percentage of income, weekly
billable hours, and number of hours of fee-producing or billable work
62. These data were kindly provided to me by George Brown from the State Bar of
Wisconsin.
63. The income variable was captured through a set of pre-specified categories. I used the
midpoint of each category as the figure for the respondents. For the lowest category, under
$20,000, I used $15,000 as the average figure. The highest category was over $175,000, and I
arbitrarily used $300,000. Because I focus on medians, the treatment of the extremes is not
particularly important to the analysis.
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during 1992. As with the aggregate figures considered in the previous
section, these data can be analyzed to produce estimates of the effec-
tive hourly rate. This involves inflating the net income to account for
overhead 64 and dividing by billable hours. The sample is small here
because only forty-three respondents indicated that their primary bill-
ing method was contingency fee, and only thirty-nine had all of the
information needed to estimate the effective hourly rate.
The median effective hourly rate obtained from my calculation was
$113, with a range, excluding one extreme outlier, from $18 to $306.
The midspread was $70 to $208. The overall median EHR can be
compared to the median set hourly rates that lawyers reported, $105.
The range of hourly rates was $30 to $275, with a midspread of $90 to
$130.65 Thus, the typical effective hourly rates reported by contin-
gency fee lawyers in Wisconsin do not differ sharply from rates
charged by lawyers billing on an hourly basis, although as one might
expect, there is more variability for the contingency fee lawyers.
In 1994, both the Michigan and Ohio bars commissioned economic
surveys of their members.66 The Applied Statistics Laboratory of Ann
Arbor, Michigan, conducted these surveys using a common set of
questions. In my analysis of unpublished data from these surveys, I
drew upon the following variables:
* net pre-tax income from law practice from the last tax year (total,
broken down by: demographics, legal specialization, race, gender,
experience and other);
" average weekly billable hours on legal work (total, broken down
by: hourly rate work, flat fee rate, contingency work, and other);
* hourly billing rate;
" the three fields of law which provided the highest source of in-
come during the last tax year, ranked from one to three;
* an estimate of the total expenses per lawyer from the last fiscal
year; and
64. If information on overhead percentage was missing, I assumed the percentage to be 50%
which was the median in the survey.
65. The survey actually asked each respondent for three figures: lowest personal hourly rate,
highest personal hourly rate, and average personal hourly rate. In the discussion below I have
used the "average" figure. The median of the lowest rates was $90, with a range from $10 to
$250; the median of the highest rates was $60 to $325, with a median of $125.
66. THE 1994 DESKTOP REFERENCE ON THE ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE IN MICHIGAN
(1995) (for reports of survey); THE 1994 DESKTOP REFERENCE ON THE ECONOMICS OF LAW
PRACTICE IN OHIO (1994) (for reports of survey).
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* an estimate of the gross receipts per lawyer from the last fiscal
year.67
Obtaining estimates based on these data was more complex than ana-
lyzing the Wisconsin data because most of the lawyers who broke the
information down by fee arrangement and who reported spending
time on contingency fee work also spent time on work billed on some
other basis. I have focused primarily on key results of the Michigan
and Ohio surveys. Details of the analysis of the surveys are found in
Appendix 3.
The clearest set of figures is for that group of lawyers whose prac-
tices probably consist mostly or solely of contingency fee work. I
based this determination either on reported time breakdowns or the
substance of their practice. I included lawyers who reported that all of
their "billable" time was devoted to contingency fee work (their total
number of billable hours was equal to the number of hours on contin-
gency fee work) plus those lawyers who did not break their time down
by billing method, but listed only contingency fee type work among
the three most important areas of practice. 68 The number of respon-
dents was small, forty-one for Michigan and thirty-four for Ohio. The
range of estimated effective hourly rates for the combined set, from
$1669 to $1,670, 70 once again emphasizes the variability, but the medi-
ans for the two groups of lawyers, $81 (Michigan) and $88 (Ohio), fall
right in the general range of figures I found working from published
data. Furthermore, using the combined set of seventy-five respon-
dents, and estimating the total gross income (i.e., inflating their re-
ported net incomes by the same overhead factor used above) and total
billable hours, one gets a total gross income of $14,151,120 and a total
of 127,280 billable hours. Dividing these figures yields an average re-
turn per hour of $111, which is virtually identical to the median hourly
rate reported above for Wisconsin.71
67. The lawyer provided information on overhead per lawyer and gross receipts per lawyer. I
used those figures to determine the percentage of gross attributable to overhead. Where this
information was missing, I assumed the percentage to be 40% which was the median in both
surveys.
68. The areas I used were personal injury (plaintiff), product liability (plaintiff), and profes-
sional malpractice.
69. The five lowest hourly rates were $16, $23, $23, $24, and $26.
70. The five highest hourly rates were $1,670, $668, $510, $257, and $239.
71. The median effective hourly rate in Wisconsin was $113. I was not able to do this type of
"summing up" analysis for the Wisconsin data because of the open-ended nature of the top
income category. My results would be extremely sensitive to the figure I plugged in for that top
end result. For example, if I set the income to $300,000 and do the calculations, I get a figure of
$163, while setting income to $175,000 produces a figure of $121. If I leave out the lawyers in the
top category, I get a figure of $93 per hour.
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C. The Wisconsin Contingency Fee Study
To obtain direct and current information on contingency fees, I
designed a study that involved a variety of types of data collection,
which included:
* a structured survey of contingency fee practitioners to obtain ba-
sic descriptive information about the lawyers' practices and infor-
mation on a sample of cases handled by the lawyers;
* observation of lawyers at work to obtain an in-depth understand-
ing of key processes such as case screening and negotiation; and
" semi-structured interviewing to ascertain whether the observa-
tional findings are sui generis.
The analysis that follows draws primarily from the survey, however,
because I rely somewhat upon all of the above sources of data, I de-
scribe all of them in this section.
1. Data Collection
The survey of contingency fee practitioners, which was carried out
during the fall of 1995, relied upon a sampling frame defined by the
Litigation Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin. 72 Lawyers provided
a total of 511 usable responses representing an estimated response
rate of forty-eight percent. 73 To obtain information on a sample of
actual cases, the survey requested data on up to three cases: the case
closed most recently after a trial had begun, the case closed most re-
cently after filing but before the start of trial, and the case closed most
recently before filing. The "most recent" strategy provides an approx-
imation to random sampling, and the three different disposition stages
provide for stratification along the key dimension of when a case is
closed. 74 Overall, lawyers provided information on 989 cases (332 un-
72. After removing government lawyers and others clearly not engaged in contingency fee
practice, the sample included a total of 1,850 target respondents.
73. I say "estimated" because the survey was mailed to a sample that included many lawyers
not involved in contingency fee practice. I included with the survey a postcard which respon-
dents could return indicating that they did not do any contingency fee work. Of the 1,850 law-
yers who received the questionnaire, 1,192 provided some kind of response. In order to estimate
the number of contingency practitioners among the 658 who did not respond, a research assistant
called about 200 law offices and asked whether the lawyer handled cases on a contingency fee
basis. Putting this all together, I estimate that 1,072 of the 1,850 lawyers receiving the question-
naire did at least some contingency fee work.
74. To further frame the sample of cases, I asked only about cases that the lawyer had closed
during the preceding twelve months (or previous fiscal year, if that was easier). I also collected
information on the number of cases the lawyer had closed in each of those categories during the
time period; this made possible the development of a weighting scheme to adjust for the relative
frequency of different types of dispositions and the lawyer's practice volume.
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filed, 390 filed but not tried, and 267 that went to trial). These cases
provide the basis for most of the analyses reported below.
My observations in law offices during 1996 involved three different
practices.75 I was excluded from very little that was relevant to my
work.76 The three settings were very different. One was a specialist
plaintiffs' firm, one was a contingency fee plaintiffs' specialist in a me-
dium-sized general practice firm, and the other was a "litigation"
(broadly defined to include criminal, civil and family) specialist in a
small general practice firm.
Finally, I conducted a total of forty-seven semi-structured inter-
views, twenty-eight with contingency fee practitioners, thirteen with
litigation defense lawyers, and six with current or retired insurance
claims adjusters. I conducted the interviews between May and Octo-
ber, 1996. The sample of contingency fee practitioners was drawn us-
ing a combination of legal directories and yellow page advertisements.
These interviews averaged about one hour in length, and all were tape
recorded and transcribed. The defense side respondents were identi-
fied from directories and in the course of interviews with other re-
spondents. 77 These interviews were conducted by telephone, and
were also, with one exception, tape recorded and transcribed.
2. Characteristics of Contingency Fees
The fraction "one-third" typically comes to mind when the topic of
contingency fees comes up. One-third is the "standard" contingency
fee figure.78 One reads of fees exceeding this amount,79 and for some
types of cases fees below this are either dictated by law (e.g., social
security disability cases, workers' compensation cases, and, in Wiscon-
sin, medical malpractice cases), or appear to reflect market forces.80
75. Only one of the four lawyers I approached turned me down. The first two lawyers I con-
tacted said "yes," the third said "no," and the fourth said "yes."
76. I was excluded from a firm business meeting in one practice, a trip to talk to an expert in
another, and a number of non-contingency fee related events in the third.
77. In my interviews with contingency fee practitioners, I solicited names of defense lawyers
and adjusters with whom I might speak. From the defense lawyers, I solicited names of addi-
tional adjusters, focusing on individuals who had recently retired (on the assumption that they
would feel less constraint than would individuals currently employed by insurance companies).
78. See Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies, supra note 4, at 30 (noting that the
usual contingency fee arrangement typically allocates one-third of a settlement or verdict to the
attorney).
79. See Barry Meier, Lawyer's Foundation Awash in Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at
D2.
80. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN AVIATION ACCIDENT
LITIGATION 44-45 (1988).
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One of the questions asked on the survey was the exact nature of the
contingency fee specified in the retainer agreement.
Excluding those types of cases for which fees are specifically gov-
erned by statutes or regulations, 58% of the cases in my sample in-
volved retainers specifying a fee as a flat percentage of the recovery,
39% employed a variable percentage, and 3% employed some other
type of contingency arrangement (see Figure 1). Of the cases with a
fixed percentage, a contingency fee of 33% was by far the most com-
mon, accounting for 92% of those cases. Five percent of the cases
called for fees of 25% or less, 2% specified fees around 30%, and 1%
specified fees exceeding 33%. Thus, only a little over half of the cases
(53%) employed the standard one-third contingency fee.81 This figure
is based only on those cases where the attorney had the leeway to
charge a one-third fee.82
The most common pattern for those cases employing a variable per-
centage called for a contingency fee of 25% if the case did not involve
substantial trial preparation (or, in some cases, did not get to trial),
and 33% if the case got beyond this point. The contingency fee rose
to 40% or more if the case resulted in an appeal. For cases not involv-
ing a lawsuit, the contingency fee percentage could be as low as 15%
or as high as 33%. The range for those cases involving a suit but not
trial was 20% to 43%. For those going to trial, the range was from
25% to as high as 50%. One of the lawyers told me that he would
consider taking certain types of risky cases which he saw as having a
high likelihood of going to trial only if the contingency fee percentage
was 50% if the case went to trial. Another lawyer explained that he
would consider quoting a fee that might involve a percentage as high
as 50% in cases where the potential client came in with an offer in
hand. In these cases, the fee would be based only on any recovery
over and above the offer in hand, with the fee being the lesser of 50%
of the additional recovery, or 33% of the total recovery. Interestingly,
these types of variable fees can work to both the client's and lawyer's
advantage. For the client, it means keeping more of the recovery. For
the lawyer, it can provide a powerful tool to convince a client to ac-
81. Compare this to the 1991 national survey of American Trial Lawyers Association
("ATLA") members which found that only 54.3% of respondents always stated fees as a fixed
percentage of recovery. See Stock, Compensation for Nonpayment Risk, supra note 44, at app.
B, question 12.
82. This stands in sharp contrast to the claim of contingency fee critics that "standard contin-
gency fees are typically at least one-third, forty and even fifty percent in cases settled before trial
and often more than fifty percent of the net recovery in cases which go to trial." Mississippi
State Bar v. Blackmon, 600 So. 2d 166, 176 (Miss. 1992), quoted in Brickman, supra note 16, at
268.
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FIGURE 1: CONTINGENCY FEE CHARACTERISTICS
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cept a settlement because the client can actually net more on a smaller
settlement where the fee is only 25% and which avoids incurring costs
associated with expert witnesses (e.g., pretrial depositions, trial prep-
aration, and actual appearance at trial). 83
Three percent of the cases involved a fee with a contingency ele-
ment that did not conform to the standard percentage fee arrange-
ment.' The variations included:
* An hourly fee up until an initial settlement offer is obtained, and
then fifty percent of anything over and above that offer.
* Hourly fee capped by thirty-three percent of the recovery.
* A flat retainer plus a percentage.
" An hourly retainer plus a percentage once that time is exhausted.
" Hourly fee up to a set maximum with a percentage if that is
exceeded.
" Premium hourly rate with no fee if there is no recovery.
" Reduced hourly rate plus a bonus based on recovery.
* Reduced hourly rate plus a reduced percentage.
" Capped hourly rate plus a percentage.
In my interviews, it was clear that some lawyers were very open to
negotiating individualized retainer agreements, while others were very
firm in offering only specific types of arrangement. Some lawyers ex-
pressed a willingness to negotiate with the client to get a case that they
viewed as good; others rejected any idea of such negotiations. Others
told me that they specifically laid out the choice of an hourly versus a
contingency fee. Another lawyer, whose practice was exclusively con-
tingency fee, told me that in a case of clear liability, severe injury, and
a relatively low policy limit, he would charge five percent or less (e.g.,
$5,000 on a $100,000 recovery) if he was able to get the insurer quickly
to tender its policy limits. 84
While the fee is usually described as being based on the gross recov-
ery (i.e., before the lawyer is reimbursed for expenses), some lawyers
in Wisconsin treat the gross recovery for fee computation purposes as
the recovery less any payments to subrogated interests. Even when
they do not do this, lawyers typically seek to get the subrogated par-
ties to take a reduced payment which serves as a way of netting more
83. See Kritzer, Contingent Fee Lawyers and Their Clients, supra note 12 (arguing that the
economic advantages of settlement often outweigh the costs of proceeding to trial).
84. One might question why the lawyer charged even this much. Would not the insurer tender
its limits directly to the injury victim? During my observation and interviews, I was told of
several cases in which insurers had talked unrepresented claimants down from a limits payment
on the grounds that if the claimant went to a lawyer to get the entire payment, they would have
to pay a sizeable fee to a lawyer.
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for the client (or as a way of having the subrogated party pay a share
of the attorney's fee).
It is not at all uncommon for lawyers to collect fees that are less
than what they are entitled to under the retainer agreement. In the
survey, I asked lawyers if the final fee differed from the fee specified
in the retainer. In 18% of the cases for which the respondents ob-
tained some recovery for their clients, the final fee was less than what
they could have taken under the terms of the contingency fee agree-
ment. The survey did not include questions as to why these reductions
occurred. Follow-up interviews suggested that two primary elements
drove the decision to take a lower fee. First, there was a perception
on the part of the lawyer that taking a smaller fee would facilitate a
settlement. For example, a lawyer might feel that the client would be
more likely to go along if the legal fee was cut from 33% to 30%, or
25% or even 20%. A large proportion of the reductions were from
one "round" figure (e.g., 33% or 25%) to another (e.g., 30% or 25%
or 20%). Second, some lawyers expressed the view that the lawyer
should not walk away with more than the client. In cases in which
substantial payments had to be made to subrogated parties, lawyers
often reduced their fee to a level that they split what was left after
paying the subrogated claims with the client. Occasionally, when the
case yields a minimal payoff, the lawyer will simply waive any fees
owed. Sometimes a lawyer will waive a fee on a small case as a means
of generating good will, particularly if the client is in a good position
to refer future potential clients to the lawyer. 85
What this survey shows, particularly when combined with observa-
tions and follow-up interviews, is that there is substantial flexibility in
the contingency fee system. Clients potentially have a range of op-
tions to choose from. This does not mean that potential clients have
any idea that there may be alternatives available, or that they "shop"
for the best arrangement. It also does not necessarily mean that the
"cheapest" is the best; a client clearly would do better to pay a lawyer
who can get a $100,000 settlement a thirty-three percent fee than to
pay twenty-five percent to a lawyer who gets only a $50,000 settle-
ment. Interestingly, there was no appreciable evidence that the lower
percentages were charged by lawyers who were less successful. 86 The
basic problem for potential clients is a lack of information. Word of
85. In my sample, in a bit over one percent of the cases in which some recoveiy was obtained,
the lawyer collected no fee.
86. If I correlate the fee percentage (using the lowest percentage quoted when the fee in-
volved a variable percentage) with the lawyer's income, I get a correlation of .12. This is statisti-
cally significant but not indicative of a meaningful relationship.
19981
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
mouth provides some information on who is and is not a "good" law-
yer, but there is virtually no information on differences in fees. Ad-
vertising would provide little information on the quality of service
and/or result, but it could provide some very useful information on fee
options.
3. Effective Hourly Rates
How well do contingency fee lawyers do in terms of the effective
hourly rates they earn from contingency fee legal practice? Recall
that by "effective hourly rate" I mean the per hour return for the time
that a lawyer devotes to a case.87 Estimating this presents some
problems for the contingency fee lawyer for at least two reasons.
First, many contingency fee lawyers do not maintain time records for
their work on contingency fee cases. Interestingly, the majority of the
lawyers who responded to my survey reported that they did keep time
records,88 but only about a quarter of the respondents actually con-
sulted their files. Even if all of the lawyers did keep time records, and
did consult those records, my observations of the lawyers at work (two
of whom did keep time records) made clear that the nature of contin-
gency fee practice (i.e., constant shifting from one case to another)
makes tracking time at best an effort at approximation. (This same
problem may apply to many hourly fee lawyers as well). The result is
that it is typically necessary to rely upon estimates of effort. This
means that a specific figure for an individual case might involve some
significant error, but if the errors are essentially random, they will can-
cel out across a set of cases.
The second problem is that if we are going to consider the effective
hourly rates obtained by contingency fee lawyers, we need to compare
them to something. The obvious comparison is to the fees charged by
hourly fee lawyers. In making such comparisons, however, we have to
be careful to exclude from the fees obtained by contingency fee law-
yers components that would typically be billed separately by hourly
fee lawyers. Under both fee arrangements expenses such as copying,
travel, witnesses, and filing fees would be handled as separately billa-
ble expenses. In contrast, while most hourly fee lawyers would also
bill separately for paralegal time, this is an expense absorbed within
the typical contingency fee. Consequently, to estimate the effective
hourly rate of contingency fee lawyers, we need to deduct from the
87. See discussion supra part I.B.
88. In the 1991 ATLA survey, 37% of the respondents reported that they had time records.
See Stock, Compensation for Nonpayment Risk, supra note 44, at app. B, question 15a.
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gross fee the equivalent of what would be charged for any paralegal
time devoted to the case.
As suggested above, describing contingency fees needs to be done
in some context. One could imagine many possible comparisons. For
example, what types of effective hourly rates do various types of phy-
sicians earn? I recently had a minor dermatological procedure carried
out. The fees by the physician came to $195 for ten to fifteen minutes
of his time (and the clinic billed another $112 for the use of its facili-
ties). The hourly rate then was something between $800 and $1,200.
Alternatively, one might compare contingency fees to the effective
hourly rate charged by a respectable automotive service operator.
The stated hourly rate for the mechanic might be $45. However, a
customer is billed for the "book time" and a good mechanic can beat
the book time by twenty-five to fifty percent. To this rate, one needs
to add the mark-up on the parts that the shop sells to its customers.
Altogether, a respectable auto mechanic shop might generate $75-
$100 per mechanic hour, excluding the wholesale value of the replace-
ment parts.
Another potential comparison is to the hourly rates charged by law-
yers with comparable training and experience. I noted above the
hourly rates reported by insurance defense lawyers in the economic
surveys of state bars. These tend to be in the $80-$100 per hour range.
However, this probably understates the actual rate for two reasons.
First, insurance defense lawyers bill for everything, including prepar-
ing the bill. Second, insurance defense lawyers increasingly rely upon
unit billing, which means that they use something akin to a book rate
for certain activities. That is, a lawyer might charge out the cost of
dictating a letter as not less than twenty or thirty minutes, even if it
takes only two or three. Similarly, a phone call may be billed as a
minimum of six minutes (1/10 of an hour) even if it took only thirty
seconds.8 9
Probably the best comparison would be to the hourly rates actually
charged by the lawyers who responded to my survey. As it turns out,
most of the lawyers (eighty-five percent) had done at least some work
on an hourly basis during the previous year. In my survey, I asked
them for the hourly rate quoted for the most recent matter they ac-
cepted on an hourly basis. A total of 389 lawyers provided informa-
tion on that hourly rate. The median hourly rate was $125 per hour
89. One defense lawyer told me that he had no problem with billing at a low hourly rate,
provided "I get to define the hour."
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and the mean was $124. This then provides a baseline for comparison
in the discussion that follows.
a. Typical Effective Hourly Rates on a Case-by-Case Basis
There are many features one might explore regarding effective
hourly rates on a case-by-case basis: How high can they go? How
much do they vary? What is the "typical" hourly rate that a lawyer
earns? How does that vary by type of case? The answers to the first
two questions are easy: lawyers can, on occasion, earn very high effec-
tive hourly rates from contingency fee work.90 I was able to compute
an effective hourly rate for 878 cases. About four percent of these
exceeded $1,000, and one percent exceeded $2,000. In three of the
cases, the EHR exceeded $3,000 with the highest single rate at $4,473.
In contrast, in about eleven percent of the cases the effective hourly
rate was negative or zero; one lawyer had an effective hourly rate of
-$2,617 and another's rate was -$1,225. Thus, if one uses $1,000 as the
"jackpot," lawyers were two and one-half times as likely to be total
losers than they were to win the jackpot. 91 A final indicator of the
variability is that the standard deviation for effective hourly rate is
extremely high, 429, reflecting the fact that the distribution in effective
hourly rates is highly skewed toward a small number of very large
figures.
The variability, and the potential of "jackpots," is not surprising.
That is, in one sense, the essence of the contingency fee. However,
how well do lawyers do in the typical case? How we define "typical"
becomes important. The presence of a small number of very high
hourly rates leads to the result that we will see very different things
depending on whether we look at the median (the middle case) or the
arithmetic mean (the common average). In fact, as I argue below, the
gap between the median and the mean tells us important things about
the nature of contingency fee practice. If I simply take all of the cases
in my sample, without considering the lawyer's caseloads or the way I
designed the sample (i.e., oversampling cases that went to trial), I find
that the median effective hourly rate is $132. This is almost the same
as the mean/median hourly rate that these same lawyers report charg-
ing for their hourly fee work.92 Thus, in about half the cases in my
90. All of the case by case rates I report have been computed after adjusting for paralegal
time.
91. If one uses $500 per hour as the "jackpot" figure, then the chances of losing and winning
the jackpot are about equal.
92. In fact, $125 falls at the 49 h percentile.
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sample, lawyers did better than the median hourly rate for hourly fee
work and in about half the cases they did worse.
If this were the end of the story, an economist would probably con-
clude that contingency fee lawyers were not pursuing an economically
rational course of action, given that the economist expects the contin-
gency fee lawyer to extract higher fees to reflect the risks the lawyer
bears and the financing services the lawyer provides. These higher
fees appear in the mean effective hourly rate, which is considerably
higher, $242. That is, in the typical case, the contingency fee lawyer
does not do better than the median hourly rate, but across a set of
cases, the lawyer will do much better. This was best expressed by one
lawyer interviewed who had a very high volume practice. He stated
that sixty to seventy percent of his gross fees came from perhaps a
dozen of the cases he closed each year. In most of his cases, he was
lucky if he met the costs of running his practice. Eliminating the top
ten percent of the cases from the sample leaves the mean effective
hourly rate for the remaining ninety percent at $136, which is virtually
the same as the overall median.93
There is yet one other way to look at the information the lawyers
provided on individual cases. How much does the average hour de-
voted to contingency fee work yield? We can estimate this by adding
up all of the hours reported on the cases in the sample and all of the
fees received (adjusted for the costs of paralegal time), and dividing
these two figures. The result, which I will label the "sample-wide
mean hourly return," is $169. As with the mean effective hourly rate,
this estimate is greatly influenced by relatively small numbers of ex-
tremely profitable cases. Dropping the ten percent most profitable
cases from the sample leaves a ten percent trimmed sample-wide
mean hourly return of $104. Dropping only the top five percent most
profitable cases, the mean hourly return is $137, which is virtually
identical to the median. This pattern reemphasizes the role of a rela-
tively small portion of cases as generating the "profits" across a port-
folio of contingency fee cases.
b. Variations in Effective Hourly Rates
The effective hourly rates might vary systematically based on either
case or lawyer factors. Figure 2 is a "box and whisker" plot showing
variations in effective hourly rates, both within and across categories
of cases. The boxes show the "midspread" of each distribution: the
middle half of the cases. The line inside each box denotes the median
93. The median for this "right-trimmed" sample is $113.
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FIGURE 2: EFFECTIVE HOURLY RATES AND CASE FACTORS
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Tried cases- m - a
Stakes under $20,000- - - 0 mmo
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over $50,000- --.- --- -• ,
Auto accident injury I- - -- 1-•
Medical Malpractice-
Other PI -
WC/SSD*•
Contract Issue
Other type of case •
Effective Hourly Rate
*Workers' Compensation or Social Security
cases. The lines outside each box extend up to one and a half box
length beyond th6 first and third quartiles. The circles show outliers.
Effective hourly rates tend to be higher for cases resolved without fil-
ing and for cases involving higher stakes. Effective hourly rates are
typically lower for cases going to trial and for cases involving lesser
stakes. Interestingly, across types of cases defined by area of law, the
median is highest for auto accident cases and lowest for medical mal-
practice. This actually is more indicative of variations related to risk:
risk is lowest in auto accident cases and highest in medical malprac-
tice. The pattern of returns lawyers obtained in medical malpractice
cases highlights the relationship between risk and effective hourly
rates. One of the lawyers who participated in the observational part
of the study was working on a large medical malpractice case. At one
point he and I worked through the likely outcomes of the case and
their probabilities, which ranged from a fifty percent chance of getting
nothing, to a ten percent chance of getting $8 million. We estimated
that his "expected" fee was $500,000 (although his actual fee could
range as high as $1.7 million under the rules governing legal fees in
medical malpractice cases in Wisconsin 94). Given the amount of time
94. Wisc. Stat. § 655.013 (1995).
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the lawyer had devoted to the case, and what was yet to come, I esti-
mated that while he might end up making as much as $1,100 per hour,
his expected effective hourly rate was $330. When I later examined
the medical malpractice cases in the sample from my survey, I had
information on forty cases. The median effective hourly rate was only
$38, which is what is shown in Figure 2. However, this reflected, in
part, that forty-five percent resulted in no payment at all. The maxi-
mum effective hourly rate reported was $2,900, and ten percent of the
cases had effective hourly rates of $1,000 or more. The mean effective
hourly rate was $334, and the aggregate effective hourly rate across all
forty cases (obtained by adding all of the fees and hours across the
cases and dividing by forty) was $338 per hour. Clearly, medical mal-
practice work produces a very good return on the investment of the
lawyer's time, but a lawyer faces some very substantial risks in under-
taking this work.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between effective hourly rates and
several different lawyer-related factors. Generally, the differences on
the lawyer dimensions are less than on the case dimensions, but some
are still worth noting. First, the women lawyers in the sample ap-
peared to generate effective hourly rates substantially below those
generated by men; the median for cases reported by men is $135 com-
pared to $100 for cases reported by women. I have no explanation for
this pattern, although it may reflect experience or position in a firm
(partners generate a slightly higher median effective hourly rate than
do solo practitioners or non-partners). There is little difference in the
median depending on the location of the practice. The impact of ex-
perience is mildly positive with the medians moving consistently
(although only slightly) higher as number of years in practice in-
creases. Not surprisingly, higher overall income is associated with
higher median effective hourly rates.
c. Adjusting for Disposition and Case Volume
In some ways the overall figures presented in the preceding section
are misleading. Recall that each lawyer provided information about
three cases: one unfiled, one filed but not tried, and one tried. The
result is that the sample greatly over-represents cases that went to
trial, and somewhat over-represents cases that were filed and not
tried. Of the 882 cases for which I can compute effective hourly rates,
27% went to "trial" (defined to include administrative hearings in so-
cial security cases and workers compensation cases), 39% were filed
but did not go to trial, and 34% were not fied. We typically talk
about 10% or fewer filed cases being resolved by trial, although cases
1998]
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FIGURE 3: EFFECTIVE HOURLY RATES LAWYER FACTORS
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can go to trial and be settled and cases can be resolved authoritatively
by an adjudicator short of a full trial.95 In my sample, because of the
way it was designed, 41% of the filed cases "went to trial." This dis-
tinction between where in the process a case is closed is important in
estimating typical effective hourly rates. That rate is lowest in tried
cases (median $96, mean $197). It rises to $144 (median) and $251
(mean) in filed but untried cases, and to $166 (median) and $286
(mean) in unfiled cases. Furthermore, 17% of the unfiled cases yield
effective hourly rates of $500 or more, 96 compared to 15% for filed
but not tried cases, and only 9% of tried cases. Clearly, some adjust-
ments are needed to accurately reflect differences arising from how
cases are disposed. To deal with this problem, I developed and ap-
plied a set of case weights to adjust the sample to more accurately
reflect the distribution of dispositions (see Appendix 4).
A second adjustment is needed to take into account the fact that
each lawyer provided information on up to three cases regardless of
95. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE
161, 162-63 (1986) (reporting that only five to ten percent of cases filed ever get to trial).
96. Five hundred dollars approximates the top 10% of cases in my overall sample. Only three
to four percent of the cases yield effective hourly rates of $1,000 or more regardless of stage of
disposition.
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FIGURE 4: EFFECTIVE HOURLY RATES AND CASELOAD
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the number of cases that lawyer disposed of during the time period of
interest. Figure 4 shows the effective hourly rate controlling for the
lawyer's case volume. In terms of medians, there is a break between
those handling ten or fewer cases (median a little over $110) and those
handling more than ten (median in the $140-$155 range). What is per-
haps more important than the medians is the way that the distribu-
tions stretch to the right as the case volume goes up: the higher
volume lawyers tend to get a larger proportion of more lucrative
cases. For all groups of lawyers, the 2 5 th percentile is around $60. In
contrast, the 7 5 th percentile is around $200 for those handling 10 or
fewer cases, $250 for those handling 10-25 cases, $330 for those han-
dling 26-100 cases, and $450 for those handling more than 100 cases.
The means for the five groups of lawyers are $186, $206, $198, $287,
and $392.97
97. Exactly what these differences reflect is not clear. They may reflect the ability of the
higher volume lawyers to select the more profitable cases (although the highest volume group
also has one of the lowest 25'1 percentiles and has the worst 10' percentile). It may also mean
that the lawyers with higher volumes have succeeded in achieving efficiencies in how they pro-
cess cases. Alternatively, it may mean that they turn cases over very quickly, investing very little
time, accepting lower settlements, but generating higher hourly rates. In fact, the median time
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Applying two separate sets of weights can create some instability in
the results. Consequently, I will first apply weights to take into ac-
count case disposition, and add the further adjustment for the lawyer's
case volume. As one would expect, and as shown in Figure 5, recom-
puting means and medians for effective hourly rates after adjusting for
dispositional patterns does increase the summary statistics (e.g.,
means and medians):
" the median goes from $132 to $154;
" the mean goes from $242 to $267 (the trimmed mean goes from
$136 to $162); and
" the sample-wide mean hourly return goes from $169 to $198
(10% trimmed from $104 to $124, 5% trimmed from $137 to
$161).
Adding the second adjustment for case volume further increases the
summary statistics:98
" the median increases to $171;
" the mean to $317 (trimmed mean to $171); and
* the sample-wide mean hourly return to $221 (10% trimmed to
$161, 5% trimmed to $190).
Some skeptics might wonder whether the figures for Wisconsin law-
yers are lower than what would be true nationally. A 1991 national
survey of members of the ATLA produces figures consistent with
what I found in Wisconsin. 99 From the available reports from the
ATLA study, it is only possible to compute a sample-wide mean
hourly return, which is $247.100 This is about ten percent higher than
the Wisconsin figure, but it does not involve any adjustment for the
cost of paralegal time. In the Wisconsin survey, the adjustment for
paralegal costs lowered the fee an average of eight percent. If the
same figure applied to ATLA members, the adjusted sample-wide
mean hourly return would be $228 (compared to $221 for the Wiscon-
sin respondents).
The adjustments discussed above make it clear that there are obvi-
ously profits to be made from contingency fee work. While it is the
top ten percent of cases that tend to produce the significant profits,
spent by the highest volume lawyers is lower (25 hours) than for any of the other groups (all of
which have medians in the range of 40 to 50 hours).
98. In making the second set of adjustments, I have omitted lawyers from one firm whose
inclusion had a disproportionate impact on the estimates of the mean hourly rate (but relatively
little impact on either the median or the sample wide mean hourly return).
99. See supra note 44.
100. See Stock, Compensation for Nonpayment Risk, supra note 44, at app. B, questions 14 &
15.
[Vol. 47:267
THE WAGES OF RISK
FIGURE 5: EFFECTIVE HOURLY RATES
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the typical contingency fee practitioner can expect even the remaining
ninety percent of cases to produce fee premiums over a portfolio of
cases amounting to twenty-five to thirty percent over what hourly fee
work generates. Contingency fee work can be very lucrative, particu-
larly for those lawyers who develop expertise and processes for han-
dling large numbers of cases. The high profitability comes from
locating a small segment of the cases that produce extremely good
returns on the lawyers' investment of time. Some lawyers are able to
"cherry pick" the good cases; others handle large volumes of cases in
order to find the occasional very profitable case. Relatively few law-
yers ever see "the really big one." One of the lawyers observed as
part of the study had been doing plaintiffs' contingent fee work for
twenty years, had a very successful practice, and had never collected a
fee of over $100,000 on a case.
d. Estimating Effective Hourly Rates from Annual Income Data
Recall that I used a variety of sources of extant annual income data
to derive estimates of the hourly rates that lawyers generated from
their contingency fee work. The survey of Wisconsin contingency fee
practitioners included questions that permitted similar estimates.
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Lawyers provided information on annual income, 101 the percentage of
their time devoted to contingency fee work, the percentage of their
gross fees derived from contingency fee work, the number of hours
during the year devoted to work on behalf of clients (as opposed to
office overhead tasks and professional activities), and the percentage
of the gross practice revenue going to cover overhead. Using the re-
sponses to these questions to arrive at an estimate of typical effective
hourly rates requires caution. In particular, some lawyers reported
devoting a very low number of hours to work for specific clients,
which suggests that these respondents probably misunderstood the
question. For some of these respondents, taking the data at face value
results in figures that appear to be implausible (e.g., a maximum effec-
tive hourly rate of $306,818). There are two alternative approaches to
resolving these problems: exclude all respondents reporting fewer
than some arbitrary number of billable hours (e.g., 500 or 1,000), or
arbitrarily impose some minimum on the number of billable hours. I
applied both approaches. I should note, however, that these adjust-
ments primarily influenced the estimates of the mean effective hourly
rate; the median changed relatively little with the adjustments. I de-
rived two sets of estimates based on annual income data, one includ-
ing time devoted to screening prospective contingency fee clients and
one not including that aspect of the lawyers' work.
Table 5 shows the results of this analysis. The medians from the
time on actual contingency fee cases are very similar to what I ob-
tained working from the case level data before adjusting for case vol-
ume. Given that the pre-adjustment case-level figures give some
measure of effective hourly rate by lawyer (rather than by case), one
should expect that these figures are roughly consistent. Interestingly,
the figures in Table 5 indicate that the medians fall by about ten to
twenty percent when the time devoted to case screening is taken into
account. The means are much more sensitive to the adjustments for
the problems in the data. The highest estimate, obtained by using a
minimum of 500 hours of "billable" time, is roughly consistent with
the mean obtained from the case-level data ($346 here compared to
$317 previously).
e. The Record Keeping Issue
One of the possible problems with the estimates above is that, even
though many of the attorneys in the sample did keep time records,
101. The income information was captured in a series of categories. Using fairly standard
statistical practice, I set each respondent's income at the midpoint of the category he or she
reported. For the highest category, $750,000 or more, I used a value of $1 million.
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TABLE 5
ESTIMATES OF EFFECTIVE HOURLY RATES
FROM ANNUAL INCOME DATA
Without Screening Time With Screening Time
Mean Median 75th 90th Mean Median 75th 90th
Without any -- $128 $291 $1,322 -- $107 $240 $1,086
adjustments
Excluding those $169 $112 $204 $346 $136 $90 $175 $284
reporting less then
500 hours
Excluding those $162 $109 $194 $326 $131 $88 $164 $278
reporting fewer than
1000 hours
Using a minimum of $346 $124 $257 $562 $293 $105 $209 $439
500 hours
Using a minimum of $239 $117 $228 $393 $201 $97 $184 $325
1000 hours I III_
'Estimates omitted; see text, p. 300.
only a small fraction of those who had such records referred to their
records in responding to the survey. One might expect that attorneys
overestimate their time, either remembering it incorrectly or respond-
ing strategically in order to make their per hour return look more
acceptable.
When I first thought about conducting the Wisconsin Contingency
Fee Study, I had the impression that virtually no lawyers working on a
contingency fee basis maintained time records. In conversations with
several local attorneys, I became aware that there were at least some
lawyers who did keep track of their time while doing work on a con-
tingency fee basis. Drawing upon a list of attorneys who were likely to
be in practices which required them to track their contingency fee
time,10 2 I conducted an unscientific survey. I asked these attorneys to
provide me with information on contingency fee cases closed over a
recent time period.10 3 These lawyers provided me with information
on a total of ninety-two cases (with gross fees received ranging from
$0 to $910,000 and lawyer effort ranging from three hours to 7,000
hours). 1° 4 As before, dividing net fee by lawyer hours produced an
102. This list was provided to me by several local persons knowledgeable about various
practices.
103. The time frame varied from lawyer to lawyer depending upon his or her case volume.
104. In addition to attorney hours, I asked each respondent to provide information on parale-
gal hours. Many cases involved no paralegal time, but others consumed substantial quantities.
To adjust for this, I subtracted an estimate of the cost of paralegal time (I assumed that the gross
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estimate of the effective hourly rate. The median was $125;105 the
mean effective hourly rate was $189.106
In the sample from the scientific survey, there were 151 cases with
information on effective hourly rates for which the lawyers reported
having consulted their case files and that those files contained time
records. 10 7 This represents only seventeen percent of the entire sam-
ple used to conduct the Wisconsin Contingency Fee Study and, conse-
quently, the data needs to be treated with caution. For these 151
cases, the median effective hourly rate was $111 and the mean was
$170. Looking separately at the unfiled, filed, and tried cases, the re-
spective medians/means are $146/$224 (n=51), $109/$170 (n=61), and
$95/$99 (n=39).
Taken together, both the earlier unscientific sample and the sub-
sample from the Wisconsin survey show that, if anything, the absence
of time records may have lead to an overestimation of the effective
hourly rates that lawyers are earning from contingency fee work.
4. Summary: The Returns of Contingency Practice
Not one of the many sources of information discussed in this section
can be described as definitive. Critics can find something to challenge
in each of the sources that were drawn upon. However, what is strik-
ing is that despite their weaknesses, the various sources and ap-
proaches point to the same general conclusions:
" The returns from contingency fee practice are at best "somewhat"
better than what lawyers earn from hourly fee practices.
" Some, perhaps much, of the surplus disappears when one takes
into account the time and effort contingency fee lawyers devote
to screening cases.
" A small segment of cases produces substantial "profits," but few
lawyers are able to tap into this segment of cases on a routine
basis.
The general consistency in the patterns I have described provides a
substantial degree of confidence that my analysis presents an accurate
picture of routine contingency fee legal practice.
cost was $30 per hour). With this adjustment, two of the cases actually yielded negative net fees.
The median adjusted fee was $6,550, with a midspread of $2,600 to $15,000.
105. The midspread is $61 to $250.
106. The average hour return, obtained by summing all of the hours reported, summing all of
the fees (after adjusting for paralegal time), and dividing these two sums to get the per hour fee,
was $160.
107. The questionnaire did not specifically ask the lawyers if they consulted their time records,
only if they consulted their case files and if those files contained time records.
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I would, of course, like to have even better data than what are now
available. The approach I have pursued with the Wisconsin contin-
gency fee is the method most likely to provide accurate information
on routine contingency fee practice.
III. CONCLUSION: PRAYING FOR JUSTICE OR PREYING
ON JUSTICE?
Contingency fee legal practice can produce substantial financial re-
wards. My analysis shows that lawyers who take a case on a contin-
gency fee basis can expect to do somewhat better than they do on
their hourly fee cases.108 The occasional very good case will yield
some significant profits over and above the balancing out of the typi-
cal better than average cases and the worse than average cases.
Under certain circumstances, lawyers can do much better from contin-
gency fee work than most lawyers do from hourly fee work.
One way to understand how this works is to think about private
legal practice as managing a portfolio of investments. A lawyer whose
practice consists entirely of hourly fee work is like an investor who
puts his or her money into a bank certificate of deposit. The principal
is safe and the return is known in advance. A lawyer working on a
fixed fee basis is akin to playing the bond market; there is more vola-
tility, but the amount at risk is somewhat controlled, and there is some
expectation of a payoff. The situation changes when contingency fee
cases are added to the portfolio.
Most of the lawyers who do contingency fee work also do substan-
tial amounts of hourly fee work. In my sample, only twenty-five per-
cent of the respondents obtained as much as seventy-five percent of
their income from contingency fee work; fifty percent of the sample
obtained thirty percent or less of their income from contingency fee
work. For the lawyers whose practices are predominantly non-contin-
gency fee, the bulk of their portfolios are in CDs (i.e., the returns are
quite predictable and the investment is relatively safe). These lawyers
invest a portion of their portfolios into risky contingency fee cases
with the hope of getting a higher return. In this portion of their port-
folios they get a better return than the whole portfolio, but occasion-
ally they do much worse. For example, the mixed practice lawyer I
observed had taken a large contingency fee case to trial and lost in the
prior year. The resulting write-off had major consequences for the
firm's profitability for that year.
108. See discussion supra part II.C.3.c.
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The nature of the portfolio strategies of the lawyers concentrating
on contingency fee work are somewhat different and varied. A very
small group of firms are able to establish reputations that permit them
to be extremely selective in the cases they pursue. They can choose
either cases that are virtual sure things or cases that have very high
potential payoffs. One contingency fee lawyer from outside Wisconsin
described his practice as involving a mix of class action cases that in-
volve high risks but extremely high returns, and more routine cases
that keep the lights burning. Having the more routine cases permits
the firm to devote some of its resources to the high risk, high return
cases. This "mixed" strategy is similar to the diversified investor who
focuses on very selective blue chip investing with a few occasional
speculations.
A variant of this can be thought of in terms of the prices of stocks.
Some stocks are quite expensive on a per share basis, and this serves
as a barrier to entry for the smaller investor. A small investor might
be willing to play the market in terms of a diversified strategy mixing
investments of varying degrees of risk and return, but may not have
the price of entry to do this with certain types of investments. This
smaller investor can still mix degrees of risk and returns. One lawyer,
whose practice is primarily social security disability cases, described
precisely this to me. He viewed his social security cases as relatively
predictable: you win most, lose some, but you know what you have at
stake, both in terms of investment of time and possible returns. These
cases provided a secure base for his practice. He also took some per-
sonal injury cases which involved greater risk and uncertainty but had
the potential of higher returns. He felt able to take these risks be-
cause of the stable base obtained from his social security practice.
A different strategy for the contingency fee specialist is to try to
produce a substantial flow of cases in order to be able to get an occa-
sional "hit." The idea here is that most cases average out between
those producing a return above the market hourly rate and those pro-
ducing a return below that hourly rate. The lawyer is looking for the
small segment of cases that can be extremely profitable, either be-
cause that segment produces a high fee or because it produces a quick
fee. The problem for the lawyer is that he or she cannot be sure which
of the cases walking in the door will be these profitable ones. This
type of portfolio might be seen as akin to a broadly spread portfolio
with a moderate amount of risk. Most of the returns work out to be
somewhat better than the savings account/hourly fee type returns. A
few of the investments pay off handsomely (i.e., the occasional com-
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pany that becomes the target of a hostile takeover and pushes the
price above what anyone had previously expected).
Finally, there is the lawyer who is more speculative in his or her
work. Many of the cases in the portfolio involve high risk, but when
the lawyer succeeds the payoffs are very substantial. One might look
at this person as a bit like a venture capitalist who regularly engages in
taking big risks and knows that a significant portion of the investments
will fall flat. However, the successful investments yield handsome
returns.
Clearly, contingency fee legal practice can be very good for those
who engage in it, but what about the clients' perspectives? Are the
lawyers doing well by doing good or are they preying on the misfor-
tunes of others? As with any type of money making situation, greed
can be a dominant factor, at least for some actors. Lawyers (and cli-
ents) are as susceptible to temptation as others. The fact that some
people make a lot of money does not mean that the system has not
benefitted others.
In one sense, contingency fees are a form of cross payments among
clients. The client who turns out to have a strong case subsidizes the
client whose case turns out to be weak. Is that good or bad? More
than likely, if the client whose case turned out to be good knew for
certain that the case was good up front, the client would have not
chosen to pay the contingency fee lawyer on a percentage basis. The
problem is that the client generally has no way of knowing how strong
a case he or she has. This reflects the combination of general uncer-
tainty about cases and the client's specific lack of information. To the
degree it is the latter, one can certainly argue that the lawyer's duty is
to advise the client as to what is in the client's best interest. The prob-
lem, of course, is that most cases are not so clear cut because cases
typically involve a variety of uncertainties:
* How will the other side respond to a demand?
* What will be the client's damages?
* What are the ambiguities in the factual situation?
Lawyers who do not rely primarily on contingency fee cases may in
fact be inclined to advise potential clients that a case would be better
handled on an hourly basis. This suggests that there are cases in which
the risks are minimal. However, what would a lawyer do if he or she
advised a client to rely upon an hourly fee arrangement only to see the
case turn sour? I suspect that this has not happened for the lawyers
who have had a client use an hourly arrangement on the lawyer's ad-
vice. Interestingly, most of the lawyers who told me that they had
recommended to a client that a matter be handled on an hourly basis
1998]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
found that clients almost always opted for the contingency fee when
advised of even the slightest possibility of a downside risk. Occasion-
ally, potential clients would themselves raise the possibility of an
hourly fee. However, most of them were in fact seeking a contingent
hourly fee, not a straight hourly fee.
My conversations with lawyers who depend mostly or exclusively on
contingency fee cases indicated that they find the idea of handling
cases on a traditional hourly basis much more problematic. First, they
need the lucrative cases to balance off the cases that they lose or for
which they obtain small returns. Recommending to clients with the
best cases that they use an hourly fee changes the overall practice
equation in ways that are unattractive. Second, some of them are not
set up to bill hourly. Third, they view the big profits yielded by some
cases as compensation for their willingness to fund cases and take
risks. One lawyer told me about a case which came to him on an
hourly fee basis. The client had originally retained a lawyer on a con-
tingency basis, but came to the decision that an hourly fee would be a
better deal. The first lawyer the client retained worked only on a con-
tingency fee basis and refused to renegotiate the fee. The lawyer and
client agreed to part ways, and the lawyer I was speaking to accepted
the case on an hourly basis. As it turns out, the case had a lot of
problems, which the contingency fee lawyer was willing to deal with
but which the client was reluctant to pay the hourly fee lawyer to han-
dle. In a sense, the client was not necessarily in the best position to
assess the risks involved in his case.
One certainly hears about clients who are unhappy about how much
they had to pay their lawyers. Unhappiness about the cost of legal
services is neither a new issue nor an issue limited to clients who paid
lawyers on a contingency fee basis. However, there is no indication
that those who pay their lawyers on a contingency basis are more
likely to be unhappy than those who pay their lawyer on some other
basis (e.g., fixed fee, hourly, etc.). Increasingly, corporations are try-
ing to move toward contingency arrangements with their attorneys.
The fact that some of the most successful contingency fee attorneys
are those who handle very large cases on behalf of major corporations
indicates that the most knowledgeable consumers of legal services are
willing to pay purely on a results achieved basis even if that means
astronomical hourly rates in the end. 109
109. See McMenamin, supra note 8, at 160 (stating that Joe Jamail is reported to have earned
$90 million during 1994, with most of his income coming from corporate clients); see also The
Forbes Four Hundred, FORBES, Oct. 16, 1995, at 190 (reporting that Jamail has an office with five
associates and no partners). If one makes the generous assumption that he works 4,000 hours
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In some ways, the bottom-line question, and probably the most dif-
ficult question to answer, is whether clients are ultimately better off or
worse off given the contingency fee as opposed to alternative mecha-
nisms of paying for legal services? Many contingency fee clients prob-
ably do pay more for legal services than they might if they paid by the
hour. However, many of those same clients would probably never
seek redress if it were not for the insurance function provided by the
contingency fee. In a sense, clients pay a premium for eased access to
the civil justice system. Furthermore, many, perhaps most, clients are
able to have access precisely because of the availability of a system
like the contingency fee. In a fundamental sense there is a tradeoff
between access and cost, where the access issue is a combination of
risk shifting from the client to the attorney and the availability of
funds up front to purchase a needed service.
Could one design a system which would permit access but reduce
the amount contingency fee clients pay? Recent proposals have sug-
gested that percentages be strictly controlled in cases where the client
receives an early offer. As noted above, in Wisconsin, many attorneys
charge lower percentages for cases resolved earlier in the process." 0
In a sense, the market has, at least in Wisconsin, already made this
available. Critics might view even these lower fees as too high. Per-
haps they are in some cases, but designing a mechanistic system which
would allow attorneys and clients to determine which cases are gener-
ating excessive fees and which are not, is very difficult. The current
proposals fail to take into account the uncertainties that typically exist
regarding damages, liability, and sources of compensation at the time
a potential client first contacts an attorney. None of the systems envi-
sion any type of post-hoc review of fees (something which technically
is already available under inherent judicial authority). Post-hoc re-
view is potentially time consuming and costly, particularly in the ab-
sence of well-established standards, but relying upon such a system
would probably serve to avoid the problems of the mechanistic sys-
tems others have proposed.
One of the ironies of recent proposals is that they have come from
quarters one would expect to be most likely to support market solu-
tions to pricing. One could imagine a couple of market-related alter-
natives that might serve to bring down existing fees. The first would
per year and has responsibility for the cases producing half of that $90 million, he is earning at
the rate of $11,250 per hour. If one assumes he works "only" 3,000 hours per year, and gener-
ates the full $90 million, this goes up to $30,000 per hour. His corporate clients do not seem to
complain.
110. See discussion supra part II.C.
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be to find ways to get more information about fees to potential clients
so that clients could make more informed choices. The obvious mech-
anism for this would be what amounts to price advertising. There is,
of course, the problem that cheapest is not necessarily best. However,
most consumers are fully aware that there is a price/quality trade-off.
Yet, simply making consumers aware that there are alternatives in
pricing will put some market pressures on the providers of the service.
Competition could also be opened up by permitting non-lawyer spe-
cialists to handle cases within some defined specialties. For example,
is there a reason why knowledgeable consumers should not have the
option of retaining private insurance adjusters to negotiate on their
behalf with an insurer? Particularly in those types of cases where the
concern about excessive charges by lawyers is greatest (i.e., the clear
liability, policy limits case), someone who knows the insurance claims
system should be able to represent a claimant's interests effectively. If
Kritzer's Claims Service will do the case for fifteen percent, while
Kritzer & Kritzer, S.C. will charge thirty percent, then the consumer
should have that choice."'
Finally, one could imagine a system in which claims were actually
sold to lawyers in an auction-like setting.112 Lawyers would bid for
claims: the better, more certain the claim, the more the lawyer would
offer (i.e., the less the lawyer would discount the projected recovery).
Obviously, there is the problem that the full value of a claim is not
necessarily known at the time a potential client may first want to re-
tain a lawyer. This might be handled by a system of lawyer brokers,
where the broker would sign up the client for a small percentage of
the ultimate recovery (i.e., five or ten percent), and provide the initial
"front-end" legal assistance (i.e., doing the things necessary to pre-
serve the claim, collect initial evidence, etc.). 113 Once the claim had
matured, the broker would put the claim up for bid. To avoid the
problem of the client walking away once the auction was completed,
the amount of the payment could be put into escrow, to be collected
only when the claim was actually paid or the case was otherwise re-
solved. If the claim was potentially lucrative but very risky, clients
would have the option of selling the claim at a steep discount, or en-
111. My own research comparing lawyer and nonlawyer advocates clearly shows that special-
ized, non-lawyer advocates can provide very effective legal representation. See HERBERT M.
KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK (forthcoming 1998).
112. See generally Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. OF LEGAL
STUD. 329 (1987) (advocating for the use of third-party lawyer brokers).
113. Id.
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tering into something that looked like a traditional contingency fee
arrangement.
The goal should be to find ways of increasing the options in the
existing system and making potential clients aware of those options.
Legislative limitations on fees are likely to have more negative than
positive consequences. In contrast, while deregulation has risks, com-
petition among service providers is more likely to have long run
payoffs than is increased regulation. Typically, limitations on legal
fees have served to reduce the availability of legal representation. 114
In contrast, creating competitive mechanisms has the potential of not
only lowering fees but also of making services available in cases where
legal representation was previously unaffordable.
114. The extreme example is veterans' benefits claims, but this is also evident in unemploy-
ment compensation cases where there are often strict limits on the fees that attorneys can charge
claimants.
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APPENDIX 1
ECONOMIC SURVEYS CONDUCTED BY STATE
BAR ASSOCIATIONS
CO 1967 [mentioned in MICH. B.J., May 1974, at 9]
CO 1972 SUSAN TAYLOR & JULIE HONNOLD, REPORT ON THE
1972 ECONOMIC SURVEY OF THE COLORADO BAR
(1973).
CO 1977 COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION, ECONOMICS OF LAW
PRACTICE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE 1977 ECO-
NOMIC SURVEY OF THE COLORADO BAR (1977).
CO 1982 1982 ECONOMIC SURVEY OF COLORADO LAWYERS
(1984).
CO 1989 COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION 1989 ECONOMIC SUR-
VEY (1992).
CO 1993 1993 Economic Survey of Colorado Attorneys (unpub-
lished statistical summary by Colorado and Denver Bar
Associations provided by David Brand).
FL 1984 THE 1984 FLORIDA BAR ECONOMICS SURVEY (1984).
FL 1986 [mentioned in RESULTS OF THE 1992 ANNUAL SURVEY
OF FLORIDA BAR MEMBERS: ECONOMICS & LAW
OFFICE MANAGEMENT 53]
FL 1989 RESULTS OF THE 1989 ANNUAL SURVEY OF FLORIDA
BAR MEMBERS: ECONOMICS & LAW OFFICE MANAGE-
MENT (1989)
FL 1992 RESULTS OF THE 1992 ANNUAL SURVEY OF FLORIDA
BAR MEMBERS: ECONOMICS & LAW OFFICE MANAGE-
MENT (1992)
GA 1968 [mentioned in GA. ST. B.J., Aug. 1969, at 112]
IA 1955 IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, INCOMES OF IOWA
LAWYERS; A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1956).
IA 1968 [mentioned in MICH. B.J., May 1974, at 9]
IA 1980 PHILIP A. HOULE, THE 1980 ECONOMIC SURVEY:
IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (1982).
IA 1985 PHILIP A. HOULE, THE 1985 ECONOMIC SURVEY:
IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (1985).
IA 1990 PHILIP A. HOULE, THE 1990 ECONOMIC SURVEY:
IOWA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (1990).
IL 1959 Daniel J. Cantor, The Economic Picture Today ... The
Illinois Survey and Spot Check of Representative Law
Offices, 49 ILL. B.J. 884 (1960).
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IL 1964 BILLIE R. BETHEL, REPORT OF THE 1964 ECONOMIC
SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION OF ILLINOIS
(1964).
IL 1971 George A.M. Heroux, Results of the 1971 Illinois Bar
Economics Survey, 60 ILL. B.J. 182 (1971).
MI 1963 The Economics of Law Practice, 43 MICH. B.J. 11
(1964).
MI 1973 The Economics of Law Practice in Michigan, 53 MICH.
B.J. 1 (1974).
MI 1981 John M. Wright, 1981 Economics of Law Practice
Survey of Michigan Lawyers, 61 MICH. B.J. 20-23, 112-
19 (1982).
MI 1984 John M. Wright, 1984 State Bar of Michigan Economics
Survey, 64 MICH. B.J. 1186-1190, 1306-1312, 65 MICH.
B.J. 22-33 (1986).
MI 1988 STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN, LEGAL ECONOMICS SEC-
TION, THE 1988 DESKTOP REFERENCE ON THE ECO-
NOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE IN MICHIGAN (1988).
MI 1991 THE 1991 DESKTOP REFERENCE ON THE ECONOMICS
OF LAW PRACTICE IN MICHIGAN (1991).
MI 1994 THE 1994 DESKTOP REFERENCE ON THE ECONOMICS
OF LAW PRACTICE IN MICHIGAN (1994).
MS 1970 [mentioned in MICH. B.J., May 1974, at 9]
MO 1958 Benchmarks for Your Practice, 15 J. Mo. B. 12 (1960).
MO 1962 Where Are You on the Totem Pole?, 19 J. Mo. B. 17
(1963).
MO 1966 [see brief description of the study in Gerald B. Rowan,
Economics of the Bar, 23 J. Mo. B. 576 (1967)]
MO 1970 WADE F. BAKER, 1970 Survey: Salaries and Non-
Salaried Lawyers Income by County Class, Employer,
and Age, 28 J. Mo. B. 535-39 (1972).
MO 1974 Cecil L. Caulkins, 1974 Economic Survey-Income of
Salaried and Non-Salaried Lawyers, 33 J. Mo. B. 221-
27 (1977).
MO 1982 James C. Wirken & Cecil L. Caulkins, 1982 Economic
Survey of Missouri Lawyers-An Overview, 39 J. Mo.
B. 541-48 (1983).
NB 1994 1994 Membership Survey Results, NBSA NEWS, June
1994, at 5-11 (Nebraska State Bar Association).
NC 1994 , NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION ECONOMIC SUR-
VEY 1994.
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NH 1990 THE 1990 DESKTOP REFERENCE ON THE ECONOMICS
OF LAW PRACTICE IN NEW HAMPSHIRE (1990).
NJ 1962 DANIEL J. CANTOR & Co., THE 1965 ECONOMIC SUR-
VEY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWYERS: CONDUCTED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION 20 (1965).
NJ 1988 ECONOMIC SURVEY OF NEW JERSEY LAWYERS (1988).
NM 1982 1982 ECONOMIC SURVEY OF NEW MEXICO LAWYERS
(1982).
NM 1989 1989 ECONOMIC SURVEY OF NEW MEXICO LAWYERS
AND LAW FIRMS (1990).
NY 1960 [mentioned in DANIEL J. CANTOR & Co., THE 1965
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWYERS: CON-
DUCTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMICS OF LAW
PRACTICE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION
23]
OH 1952 Milton Kafoglis, Economic Condition of the Legal
Profession in Ohio, 28 OHIO B. 866, 907, 935, 978
(1955).
OH 1990 OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, THE 1990 DESKTOP
REFERENCE ON THE ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE IN
OHIO (1990).
OH 1994 THE 1994 DESKTOP REFERENCE ON THE ECONOMICS
OF LAW PRACTICE IN OHIO (1994).
OK 1970 [mentioned in MICH. B.J., May 1974, at 9]
OR 1963 DAVID A. BAERNCOPF & DONALD A. DOLE, SURVEY
OF THE ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE (1963).
OR 1971 [mentioned in MICH. B.J., May 1974, at 9]
OR 1981 [mentioned in ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE: 1989
SURVEY RESULTS (1989)]
OR 1989 ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE: 1989 SURVEY RESULTS
(1989).
PA 1965 DANIEL J. CANTOR & Co., THE 1965 ECONOMIC SUR-
VEY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWYERS: CONDUCTED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION (1965).
TN 1971 [mentioned in MICH. B.J., May 1974, at 9]
TN 1994 THE TENNESSEE BAR ASSOCIATION STATEWIDE SUR-
VEY OF LAW FIRM MANAGEMENT (1994).
TX 1967 Texas Economic Survey, 31 TEX. B.J. 6 (1968).
TX 1987 THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS 1987 MEMBERSHIP SURVEY
(1987).
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TX 1989 HOURLY RATE REPORT: THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS
1989 LAW FIRM ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT SUR-
VEY (1989).
TX 1992 ATTORNEY COMPENSATION REPORT: THE STATE BAR
OF TEXAS 1992 ATTORNEY BILLING AND COMPENSA-
TION SURVEY (1992).
TX 1992 HOURLY RATE REPORT: THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS
1992 ATTORNEY BILLING AND COMPENSATION SURVEY
(1992).
US 1988 ALTMAN & WELL, INC., THE SMALL LAW FIRM
ECONOMIC SURVEY (1988).
WA 1974 THE ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE IN WASHINGTON
STATE (1974).
WI 1983 Frank Murphy, State Bar Membership Survey: Where
the Big Bucks Aren't-A Look at Lawyer Income, 57
Wis. B. BULL. 28-29 (1984).
WI 1987 Survey Reveals: Wisconsin Attorney Income Up 11
Percent, 61 WIs. B. BULL. 14-16 (1988).
WI 1992 BECKY WEINER, 1992 ECONOMICS OF PRACTICE SUR-
VEY REPORT (1993).
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APPENDIX 2
ESTIMATING EFFECTIVE HOURLY RATE FROM ANNUAL
INCOME DATA
In this Appendix, I detail the construction of the results shown in
Table 2. Table A shows the same data contained in Table 2, but each
row is shown with a row number and each column with a column let-
ter. Each cell in the table is designated by its column/row position.
Rows 1, 2, and 4 were taken from the various economic surveys
from 1990 through 1994. No effort was made to adjust Row 1 for in-
flation, because it is not clear to me that there has been that much
change over the period, or if there has been a change, that it is consis-
tent with standard price/income inflators/deflators.
Row 3 was computed by dividing Row 1 by 1 minus Row 2. That is,
cell A3=A1/(1-A2) or $98,000=$63,000/(1-.36).
Row 6 simply divided Row 3 by Row 4. That is, cell A6=A3/A4 or
65=98,000/1,500.
Row 5 is the tricky one. Here I divided the highest income (D3) by
the lowest hours (A4), and the lowest income (A3) by the highest
income (D4), etc. Specifically:
A5 = A3/D4 or 49 = 98,000/2,000
B5 = B3/C4 or 69 = 117,000/1,700
C5 = C3/B4 or 88 = 145,000/1,650
D5 = D3/A4 or 150 = 225,000/1,500
TABLE A
COMPUTING THE ESTIMATES OF EFFECTIVE HOURLY
RATES FROM ANNUAL INCOME DATAa
A B C D
low best low best high high
estimate estimate estimate estimate
1 Annual net income
before taxes Al B1 C1 D1
2 Overhead as a
percent of gross A2 B2 C2 D2
3 Estimated gross income A3 B3 C3 D3
4 Billable hours worked A4 B4 C4 D4
5 Effective Hourly Rate 1 A5 B5 C5 D5
6 Effective Hourly Rate 2 A6 B6 C6 D6
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APPENDIX 3
ANALYZING THE MICHIGAN AND OHIO LAWYER
ECONOMIC SURVEYS
As mentioned in the body of this paper, the data from the Michigan
and Ohio economic surveys raised a number of analytical problems.
Theoretically, the information the respondents provided should have
allowed me to focus in on the contingency fee effort. That is, assum-
ing the simple case of a lawyer who does both hourly and contingency
work, I could take the lawyer's estimated gross, multiply time billed
on an hourly basis by hourly rate and subtract that out from the gross.
This calculation should leave the income generated by contingency fee
work which could then be divided by the hours on contingency fee
work to provide an estimate of effective hourly rate. 115 In fact when I
did this, I found that for about one-third of the lawyers who reported
spending time on contingency fee work-calculated by subtracting out
hourly fee work (number of weeks1 16 x hours per week on hourly fee
work x hourly rate), flat fee work (computed similarly using 1/ the
hourly rate), and other non-contingency fee work (computed using a
fixed hourly rate of $40)-the result was negative income from contin-
gency fee work. The median effective hourly rates I obtained were
$53 for Ohio and $42 for Michigan. If I arbitrarily throw out those
respondents from whom I received negative hourly rates, I get medi-
ans of $143 and $111. None of these figures make a lot of sense.
Further examination of the data suggests that the problem here is
less with the contingency fee information than with the information
used to back out income from non-contingency fee work. If I limit the
analysis to those attorneys who name personal injury (plaintiff) work
as one of the three most important sources of income, the results be-
gin to make more sense. In Ohio, I obtained a negative hourly rate
for 19% of the respondents. This represented an overall median of
$71.5, and a median of $99 omitting those with a negative hourly rate.
For Michigan, 28% of those responding had a negative hourly rate,
115. The situation is more complex because many lawyers also reported flat fee work and
other work (most of which is governmental work at court-appointed rates or government con-
tract rates). For estimating purposes, I presume that the flat-fee rate is one-half of the quoted
hourly rate and that the government rate is a flat $40 per hour. Both of these figures are proba-
bly low, the effect of which is to ultimately overestimate the effective hourly rate for contingency
fee work.
116. I used a figure of 40 in all of my calculations for number of weeks. This was an extremely
conservative figure which would tend, ultimately, to inflate the hourly rates I derived. However,
because the median number of billable hours per week reported here is around 40, this yields an
annual total billable hours median of around 1,600. This makes more sense than a figure ap-
proaching 1,900-2,000.
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the overall median was $50, and the median EHR, omitting negatives,
was also $99. If I limit the analysis to those who reported personal
injury (plaintiffs) as the single most important source of income, only
7% of the respondents in Ohio had negative hourly rates, with an
overall median of $61. The median without the negatives was $66. In
Michigan, the corresponding figures were 17%, $70, and $77.
We can also limit the analysis based upon how much time lawyers
devote to contingency fee work. Taking just those respondents who
reported spending twenty or more hours on such work, only about
10% and 15% of the hourly rates come out negative. The medians are
$61 and $74 including the negative hourly rate respondents, and $75
and $80 excluding those cases. If we limit the analysis to those attor-
neys who indicated that they devoted all of their billable time to con-
tingency fee work, the number of such respondents in each survey is
not large. 117 However, the figures are informative. None of these re-
spondents produce negative hourly rates (which could only happen if
lawyers had negative net income). The resulting median effective
hourly rates are $78 (thirty-three respondents) 1 8 and $84 (thirty
respondents), 19
One of the problems with all of these figures is that they are limited
to those attorneys who provided a breakdown in their time across
hourly fee, contingency fee, fiat fee, and other work. Attorneys who
spent all of their time on contingency fee work might not have both-
ered to provide a breakdown and just provided a figure for total billa-
ble hours. This suggests a second approach: focusing on attorneys
whose practices probably consist mostly of contingency fee work
based either on reported time breakdowns or the substance of their
practice. Thus, I identified lawyers who reported only a total billable
hours figure and who listed only contingency fee type work among the
three most important areas of practice,1 20 or who reported identical
figures for total billable hours and billable hours on contingency fee
work. Again, the number of respondents was small, forty-one for
Michigan and thirty-four for Ohio; that is, the set of respondents here
is virtually identical to the set focusing only on lawyers who explicitly
117. These respondents gave identical figures for total billable time and for time devoted to
contingency fee work.
118. The range is $16 to $668 and the midspread (i.e., the middle 50%) is $50 to $169.
119. The range is $23 to $1,670 and the midspread is $45 to $137. Note that the $1,670 is a
clear outlier because the second highest is $216 and the respondent from whom I obtained the
$1,670 per hour reported only two billable hours per week. It may be that this represents some
kind of error in the data.
120. The areas I used were personal injury (plaintiff), product liability (plaintiff), and profes-
sional malpractice.
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reported all of their time on contingency fee work. Not surprisingly,
the results are very similar: medians of $81 and $88.
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APPENDIX 4
ESTABLISHING WEIGHTS TO ADJUST FOR
DISPOSITIONAL PATTERNS
Estimating what percentage of cases accepted by lawyers get filed
as court cases is not easy because there is no systematic record keep-
ing of unfiled cases. Different sources of information produce varying
estimates. A study conducted in five federal judicial districts in the
late 1970s estimated that the cases of just under half of those dispu-
tants who retained a lawyer resulted in a court filing; in tort cases, the
figure was 33%.121 A national study of compensation for injury con-
ducted in the late 1980s by the RAND Corporation's Institute for
Civil Justice reports both the percentage of cases in which lawsuits
were filed and the percentage of claimants who hired lawyers.1 22
From RAND's published data, I estimate that 42% of the cases han-
dled by lawyers resulted in a suit being filed. 123 An insurance industry
study of auto personnel injury liability claims resolved in 1992 found
figures as high as 42% in California and Tennessee, but only 17% in
Wisconsin.' 24 The Texas Department of Insurance ("TDI") puts out
an annual report regarding commercial liability claims. 125 For 1994,
TDI reported that in cases leading to payments of $10,000 or more,
with attorney representation of the claimant, 61% involved the filing
of a lawsuit.126
For my purposes, I could try to estimate the percentage of cases in
each of the categories based on data collected in the Wisconsin Con-
tingency Fee Survey (I asked the lawyers how many cases they termi-
nated during the year in each of the three dispositional categories). If
I do this, I get estimates of 10% tried, 37% filed but not tried, and
121. Computed from Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes:
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 L. & Soc'Y REV. 525, 544 (1980-81).
122. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 20-22 (1991).
123. Id.
124. INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTO INJURIES: CLAIMING BEHAVIOR AND ITS IM-
PACT ON INSURANCE COSTS 53 (1994).
125. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, THE 1994 TEXAS LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM AN-
NUAL REPORT (1994).
126. Id. at 58. This high figure does not simply mean that cases in Texas are more likely to
result in suits. In auto injury claims in Texas, only 12% of Texas auto injury cases involving
lawyers result in lawsuits. Part of the 61% figure reflects that the Texas Department of Insur-
ance reports only those cases in which a payment is made, and only those involving payments of
at least $10,000. A national study of commercial liability claims closed in 1993 with payments of
$75,000 or more found that 92% of the claims involved a lawsuit. ISO DATA, CLOSED CLAIM
SURVEY FOR COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY: SURVEY RESULTS 6 (1994).
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52% not filed. 127 This would mean that 21% of filed cases went to
trial, but this seems much too high. If one assumes that only about
10% of filed cases go to trial, then we can adjust the above figures to
reflect that ratio. Based on this logic, I arrived at estimates that 4%
of cases are tried, 40% are fied but not tried, and 56% are not filed.
These estimates may still overestimate the proportion tried, but once
the proportion is down to 4%, further reductions have little effect on
the values I get for the mean or median effective hourly rates. Using
this distribution, I developed a set of weights to adjust my sample to
these proportions.
127. In this calculation, I have discounted the responses of six lawyers who claimed to have
tried between 72 and 300 cases during the year. I have arbitrarily reduced each of these re-
sponses to 30, which still seems high but not totally out of sight. Some of these "trials" were in
fact administrative hearings in social security and workers' compensation tribunals. Lawyers
handling those cases do have higher volumes of hearings but not that high.
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